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RULE 10B-5 AND THE RISE OF THE
UNJUST ENRICHMENT PRINCIPLE
JAMES J. PARK†
ABSTRACT
Securities regulation has traditionally focused on encouraging
truthful disclosure that facilitates the accurate pricing of securities. A
typical securities fraud claim under the primary antifraud provision,
Rule 10b-5, must thus point to a misrepresentation or omission that is
material to investors. At the same time, it is undeniable that Rule
10b-5 has been extended to conduct that does not fit this traditional
conception of fraud, most notably insider trading. This Article shows
that such deviations have become more common as Rule 10b-5 has
increasingly become concerned with the problem of unjust
enrichment. In numerous areas, the courts have applied Rule 10b-5 to
deceptive conduct that is not directed at the market or investors but
unjustly enriches some individual. Surprisingly, the unjust enrichment
principle has functioned not only as an expander of liability but also
as a limit. More and more, securities fraud class actions directed at
market-distorting misrepresentations may only proceed if insiders
have been enriched by the misrepresentation. The rise of the unjust
enrichment principle demonstrates that securities regulation is not
only concerned with the economic value of market efficiency but also
is significantly influenced by public values. Securities regulation is
guided by an evolving principle that sets some limits on the ability to
extract wrongful gains from the securities markets. Though unjust
enrichment is undeniably a concern of Rule 10b-5, it should be a
second-order concern subordinate to the first-order concern of
efficient markets.
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INTRODUCTION
According to the conventional account, securities regulation is
1
based primarily on a policy of truthful disclosure. Rather than
regulating markets with a heavy hand, the securities laws facilitate the
operation of efficient markets by encouraging the disclosure of
accurate information. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s
(SEC) Rule 10b-5 is the primary legal enforcement mechanism that
2
polices the truth of company disclosures to investors and the market.
Consistent with a disclosure regime, and despite its vague and
expansive text, Rule 10b-5 has been mainly viewed as an antifraud
3
rule. As Justice Lewis Powell declared in an often-quoted passage in

1. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (“[O]nce full and fair
disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential
concern of the statute.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669 (1984) (“The securities laws . . . . had and
still have two basic components: a prohibition against fraud, and requirements of disclosure
when securities are issued and periodically thereafter.”).
2. Rule 10b-5 reads:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
Rule 10b-5 implements Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2006 & Supp. III 2009), which makes it unlawful “[t]o
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
3. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666 n.27 (1983) (“[T]o constitute a violation of
Rule 10b-5, there must be fraud.”); David S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial
Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 NW. U. L. REV. 627, 665 (1963) (“All three subsections of
section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 should be viewed as fraud sections and recovery should be allowed
only in the event that the fraud can be discovered.”); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral
Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 407 (1999) (“The idea of ‘fraud’ is
important in insider trading law not only because the Supreme Court has recognized the
concept as a limit to expanding liability, but also because ‘the proscription of fraud’ expresses
one of the basic purposes of federal securities regulation.” (footnote omitted)); Steve Thel, The
Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 409
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Chiarella v. United States, “[s]ection 10 (b) is aptly described as a
5
catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.” By punishing
companies that mislead the market, Rule 10b-5 provides an additional
6
incentive to comply with mandatory disclosure laws, helping create
the foundations for an efficient securities market and protecting
investors who rely upon such disclosures. Securities regulation is thus
7
commonly seen as primarily promoting economic efficiency.
Despite the cleanness of the efficient-markets conception of Rule
8
10b-5, the prohibition of insider trading has made it difficult to think
of Rule 10b-5 as a rule exclusively concerned with fraud. Insider
trading doctrine has developed in fits and starts because of the
9
difficulty of characterizing insider trading as fraud. Indeed, despite
the fact that they both originate from Rule 10b-5, insider trading and
securities fraud doctrine are often treated as unrelated bodies of law.
Unlike fraudulent statements directed at investors or the market, the
primary wrong of insider trading is not market harm but rather the
(1990) (“[U]nderlying the Supreme Court’s rule 10b-5 cases is the image of a statute directed at
nothing more than promoting candor and eliminating fraud.”).
Despite the doctrine developed by the courts, there are questions as to whether the
legislative history of the securities laws supports the hegemony of the antifraud rule. See, e.g.,
Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1047, 1068–88 (1995) (arguing that disclosure statutes addressed the problem of promoters who
could unjustly enrich themselves through stock offerings); Thel, supra, at 460 (arguing that the
Securities Exchange Act is directed in part at manipulation by speculators).
Moreover, there is an inevitable overlap between fraud prohibited by the federal
securities laws and state corporate-governance issues. See James D. Cox, Fraud Is in the Eyes of
the Beholder: Rule 10b-5’s Application to Acts of Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV.
674, 691 n.75 (1972).
4. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
5. Id. at 234–35; see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971) (“We agree that Congress by § 10 (b) did not seek to regulate transactions which
constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement.”). For an analysis of Justice
Powell’s role in shaping Rule 10b-5 doctrine, see A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 930–45 (2003).
6. Of course, companies have reputational incentives to disclose truthful information. The
market will likely punish the stock price of companies with management that routinely lies to
the market.
7. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 10 (“[S]ecurities law . . . focuses primarily on the goal of
economic efficiency in lieu of distributional objectives.”).
8. As Elizabeth Warren notes in the bankruptcy context, “clean” explanations are not
always the best. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 811 (1987)
(“I have offered a dirty, complex, elastic, interconnected view of bankruptcy from which I can
neither predict outcomes nor even necessarily fully articulate all the factors relevant to a policy
decision.”).
9. See infra Part II.A.2.
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benefit extracted by the individual who wrongfully exploits inside
information. Others have thus noted that insider trading can be
10
described as a form of unjust enrichment, though there has been
discomfort with extending Rule 10b-5 beyond its traditional focus on
11
fraud. Therefore, the insider trading prohibition and its link to
unjust enrichment have largely been treated as an embarrassing but
isolated anomaly in Rule 10b-5 doctrine.
This Article argues that, far from being an ancillary concern, the
unjust enrichment principle has increasingly defined the scope of
Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5 is becoming just as much an unjust
enrichment rule as it is an efficient-markets rule. The Supreme
12
Court’s decision in United States v. O’Hagan conclusively established
that Rule 10b-5 could be directed at deceptions whose primary harm
13
is unjust enrichment rather than fraud that hinders efficient markets.
By adopting a misappropriation theory of insider trading, O’Hagan
recognized that Rule 10b-5 is not limited to fraudulent statements
directed at the market or investors. Instead, O’Hagan held that Rule
10b-5 can be triggered by deceptions directed at non–market
participants, so long as those deceptions coincide with a securities
transaction. In doing so, O’Hagan extended Rule 10b-5 to cover
unjust enrichment that does not directly distort the market. In the
wake of O’Hagan, the unjust enrichment principle has expanded the
scope of Rule 10b-5 in a number of areas, including cases directed at
14
broker-dealer misappropriation and mutual-fund market timing.

10. See, e.g., WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 3.5.2 (2d
ed. 1996) (“The public perception is that much stock market insider trading unjustly enriches
the information possessor.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary
Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 26 (1982) (asserting that the
prohibition of insider trading is based on a principle that prohibits fiduciaries from unjustly
enriching themselves); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1500 (1999) (“[M]any securities market participants view insider trading
as the wholly unjust enrichment of those privy to significant confidential information.”); Robert
B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort
Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 395–96 (1984) (observing that the “prohibition [of insider
trading] is aimed at preventing insiders’ unjust enrichment,” not at compensating victims).
11. See, e.g., Strudler & Orts, supra note 3, at 407 (“But the unjust enrichment principle,
taken as a full explanation of the prohibition against insider trading, would prove too much. If
one accepted unjust enrichment as the basic justification for what is wrong with insider trading,
there is no reason why the principle should apply only to the illegal acquisition or misuse of
information.”).
12. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
13. See infra Part II.B.2.
14. See infra Part III.
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Securities fraud and insider trading doctrine in many ways have
been unified by the unjust enrichment principle. In addition to its
expansive influence with respect to insider trading, the unjust
enrichment principle has also played a role in limiting the scope of
Rule 10b-5 with respect to securities fraud class actions. Although the
efficient-markets and unjust-enrichment conceptions of Rule 10b-5
have largely been two ships passing in the night, there has been
tension between the two paradigms as courts have used the unjust
enrichment principle to restrict the reach of securities fraud class
actions. In determining whether a defendant in a securities fraud class
action acted with scienter, the courts often require the plaintiff to
allege that a defendant received a “concrete benefit” in order for the
15
case to proceed. Some commentators have gone so far as to propose
that only securities fraud class actions involving allegations of insider
16
trading should be permitted. Thus, even in the context of punishing
market-distorting fraud, courts often focus on the issue of unjust
enrichment.
The rise of the unjust enrichment principle demonstrates that
securities regulation is not solely concerned with technical efficiency
concerns but also relates to targeting conduct that offends public
17
values. Though it is an essential part of securities regulation, the
danger of the unjust enrichment principle is its potential to divert the
attention of Rule 10b-5 from its primary purpose: encouraging
efficient markets. To check this tendency, it makes sense to think of
Rule 10b-5 as having two distinct concerns. The first-order concern is
to prohibit significant misstatements that distort the ability of the
market to value a stock correctly. The second-order concern is to
target unjust enrichment relating to misconduct that does not
necessarily impact market prices but that offends the public values
reflected by the unjust enrichment principle. Securities regulation not
only helps markets function efficiently but also is guided by a
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See infra Part IV.C.
17. This distinction reflects ideas from an earlier article noting the contrast between an
administrative approach that emphasizes cost-benefit analysis and a public-values approach. See
James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 662–74
(2007) (contrasting the administrative and public-values approaches). In the antitrust context,
there is a similar contrast between economic and political approaches to regulation. Compare
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979)
(emphasizing a political approach in conflict with an economic approach), with Daniel A. Crane,
Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2008) (preferring a technocratic
approach over a populist, democratic approach).
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principle that limits the extent to which wrongful gains can be
extracted from the market.
Part I of this Article describes the dominant conception of Rule
10b-5 as an antifraud rule meant to facilitate efficient markets. Part II
describes the evolution of insider trading doctrine so that it now
reflects an unjust enrichment principle. Part III describes how the
unjust enrichment principle has increased the substantive reach of
Rule 10b-5 in a number of contexts. Part IV relates to the tension
between the efficient-markets and unjust-enrichment conceptions of
Rule 10b-5 in the context of the scienter standard, which is evolving
in such a way that it focuses more and more on individual enrichment.
Part V argues that Rule 10b-5 is best seen as having two concerns, a
first-order concern relating to efficient markets, and a second-order
concern relating to unjust enrichment. It argues that the rise of the
unjust enrichment principle illustrates that securities regulation does
more than further economic goals: it also reflects public values. In a
world in which the public is increasingly focused on wrongful
enrichment by market participants, Rule 10b-5 should play an
important though limited role in punishing the worst forms of unjust
enrichment relating to securities transactions.
I. RULE 10B-5 AS AN ANTIFRAUD RULE
As noted in the Introduction, securities regulation is centered on
18
a truthful disclosure requirement, which is largely enforced through
the antifraud provision set forth in Section 10(b) of the Securities
19
20
Exchange Act of 1934 and implemented by Rule 10b-5. Because
the SEC reviews only a small percentage of disclosures for accuracy
21
and cannot verify most disclosed information, securities fraud
actions brought pursuant to Rule 10b-5 are the main legal mechanism
18. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977) (noting that the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 implements a “philosophy of full disclosure” (quoting
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1971))); Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 1, at 670 (“The dominating principle of securities regulation is that anyone willing to
disclose the right things can sell or buy whatever he wants at whatever price the market will
sustain.”); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 869–86 (2003) (describing the disclosure
regime and its expansion).
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
21. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL
OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 10 (Comm. Print 2002)
(noting that the SEC reviewed about 16 percent of the filings it received in 2001).
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for policing the accuracy of periodic filings and disclosures. This Part
traces the initial evolution of the theory and doctrine defining the
scope of Rule 10b-5 securities fraud actions. Although the initial goal
of prohibiting fraud was the protection of investors, the mandatory
disclosure and antifraud regime is now primarily justified as a means
of enhancing the efficiency of markets. Many of the Supreme Court’s
securities fraud decisions interpret Rule 10b-5 in a way that
emphasizes the efficient-markets goal by narrowing the scope of
securities fraud actions so that they mainly reach fraudulent
statements that cause market distortions.
A. Efficient Markets and Rule 10b-5
In its early days, the primary goal of securities regulation was
23
seen as protecting investors. For example, the few early empirical
studies assessing mandatory disclosure asked whether disclosure
24
resulted in greater returns for investors. Though investor protection
still plays a significant role in securities regulation, the focus of
25
protection has shifted from the investor to the market. These
developments are partly a result of the incorporation of financial
theory into both the legal literature and doctrine. The ideal of an
efficient market set forth a new role for Rule 10b-5 as a protector of
markets.

22. In addition, there are other provisions providing a remedy for fraud in particular
circumstances, such as the issuance of securities. See Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) § 11,
15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
23. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (“Defrauded
investors are among the very individuals Congress sought to protect in the securities laws.”);
Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 336 (1979) (“[F]ew would disagree that the antifraud provisions
tend to focus more on the role of protection than on the role of efficiency.”); Alan B. Levenson,
The Role of the SEC as a Consumer Protection Agency, 27 BUS. LAW. 61, 61–62 (1971) (“If the
Securities and Exchange Commission is to be viewed as a ‘consumer protection agency’ and,
indeed, it was so designed by Congress, the consumers which it was designed to protect are the
public investors.”); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1977) (“The SEC, however,
has come to perceive the primary purpose of the securities laws to be the protection of
investors, rather than improved resource allocation.” (footnote omitted)).
24. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 19 BUS. LAW.
721, 725 (1964) (“The basic test [of disclosure] is simplicity itself: how did investors fare before
and after the S.E.C. was given control over the registration of new issues?”).
25. See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1, 66 (1980) (“Antifraud rules, such as rule 10b-5, are designed to reduce the transaction
costs of exchange.”).

PARK IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2010]

10/17/2010 10:36:59 PM

THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT PRINCIPLE

353

Beginning in the 1960s, financial economists hypothesized that
stock markets were efficient in that a stock price reflects all known
26
information relevant to the value of the stock. They produced
evidence that stock prices followed an unpredictable random walk,
indicating that a stock price reflects current information rather than
27
being determined by patterns reflected in past stock prices. The
efficient-markets hypothesis distinguished between weak, semi28
strong, and strong forms of efficiency. The weak form of efficiency
contends that future stock prices cannot be predicted by studying past
29
stock prices. The semi-strong form of efficiency contends that stock
30
prices reflect all publicly available information about the issuer. The
strong form of efficiency contends that stock prices reflect all
31
information, whether publicly available or not, about the issuer.
Perhaps the first legal academic to extensively analyze securities
regulation through the lens of the efficient-markets hypothesis was
law and economics scholar Henry Manne. In an article following the
1966 publication of his controversial defense of insider trading,
32
Insider Trading and the Stock Market, Manne notes that he failed to
appreciate in his book that the link between insider trading and
market efficiency was the strongest argument for allowing insider
33
trading. Manne argues that because insiders are in the best position

26. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (reviewing a decade’s worth of empirical research on efficient
capital markets and stating that “[a] market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available
information is called ‘efficient’”).
27. See Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34, 34–35 (1965)
(explaining that data suggest that the random-walk theory is correct in that successive prices are
independent and the price changes conform to some probability distribution).
28. Fama, supra note 26, at 383; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reineir H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 555 (1984) (“Eugene Fama’s landmark
1970 review article first proposed the now-familiar division of the [Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis] into ‘weak,’ ‘semi-strong,’ and ‘strong’ forms as a device for classifying empirical
tests of price behavior.”).
29. See Fama, supra note 26, at 383.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). In his book,
Manne primarily argues that insider trading does not hurt long-term investors, id. at 77–110, and
that insider trading is a way of compensating entrepreneurs, id. at 111–58.
33. See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547,
565 (1970) (“The efficient functioning of the stock market is actually one of the strongest
arguments for unfettered insider trading, though at first blush it may appear to have little
relationship to the issue at hand.”); see also Hsiu-Kwang Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260, 266 (1968) (“Insider speculation
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to assess the significance of new information that might impact a
company’s stock price, insider trading would increase the speed at
34
which market prices accurately reflected new information.
By 1968, the economist Irwin Friend could declare: “The
economic justification for disclosure, which is perhaps the most basic
mechanism of securities regulation, is the belief that the provision of
information to prospective investors is a necessary condition for
35
efficient markets.” Before long, the SEC and its critics were also
citing the efficient-markets hypothesis. A 1977 report by the Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC discussed the
efficient-markets hypothesis as a justification for mandatory
36
disclosure rules. In his 1979 book, The SEC and Corporate

performs an important function in the stock market; it increases both allocational efficiency and
promotional efficiency.”).
34. Manne, supra note 33, at 565–75. This conclusion has been questioned. Ronald Gilson
and Reineir Kraakman note that trades by insiders in themselves may not transmit information
to the market. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 28, at 629–31 (“Insiders trade because
private information alters their expectations. But their trading will change the market’s
expectations about the security, and hence its price, only if their private information is somehow
transmitted to the market.”).
35. Irwin Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of Securities Markets, in
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 185, 187 (Henry G.
Manne ed., 1969); see also George J. Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC’s
Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE SECURITIES, supra, at 23, 26 (“Perhaps one of the most important arguments for
requiring that accounting statements be disclosed is that they convey information that is
required for the stock market to be efficient.”); Levenson, supra note 23, at 62 (“The economic
justification for disclosure as the keystone of investor protection lies in the belief that material
corporate and financial information disseminated to prospective investors provides a rational
basis to evaluate securities and this is a necessary precondition to efficient markets.”).
36. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REP. OF
THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC, 644–47 (Comm. Print
1977). The report linked the disclosure system to the goal of creating efficient markets: “The
system of corporate disclosure that emerged under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act can
best be understood as one aspect of an essentially two-pronged regulatory approach that was
designed to promote more efficient securities markets.” Id. at 560.
In addition, the move to an integrated disclosure system by the SEC assumes an
efficient market. See, e.g., Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,698 (Sept. 2, 1980)
(premising the shelf-registration mechanism on an assumption that “investors are protected by
the market’s analysis of information about certain companies which is widely available, both
from the Commission’s files and other sources, and that such analysis is reflected in the price of
the securities offered”); SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE ’33 AND ’34 ACTS (THE WHEAT REPORT) 10, 48, 52,
54 (1969) (emphasizing the role of sophisticated investors and professionals in filtering
information and the speed at which dissemination occurs).
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37

Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Purpose, Homer Kripke takes a
contrary view, using the efficient-markets hypothesis to critique the
SEC’s disclosure system. Kripke notes that if markets are efficient, it
is unlikely that an amateur investor can take advantage of disclosures
to find an undervalued stock because the investor cannot move
quickly enough to take advantage of the information before it is
38
reflected in the stock price. Kripke also questions the importance of
information summarizing past performance when stock prices are
39
determined by future performance. He acknowledges, however, that
the mandatory disclosure system should not be abandoned because
past financial information can be useful in analyzing the fundamental
40
value of a stock.
Scholars also began linking the Rule 10b-5 fraud prohibition to
41
the needs of an efficient market. Victor Brudney noted in 1979 that
the goal of an antifraud provision “is to improve the efficiency of the
market so that the price reflects value, and therefore financial, and
42
ultimately real, resources will be optimally allocated.” Gregg Jarrell
has noted that fraud would increase the information risk faced by
43
investors. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have observed that
“[f]raud reduces allocative efficiency” and “[a]ccurate information is
37. HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH
(1979).
38. Id. at 86–87 (“[Efficient-market studies] point to a fundamental flaw in the SEC’s
standard rhetoric that disclosure in its documents will enable the investor to make an informed
judgment after he is appraised of all the facts. If a market layman or an unsophisticated market
professional determined from those documents that a security were undervalued, he might or
might not be wrong on the facts, but in any event he would be wrong on the timing.”).
39. Id. at 31–32.
40. Id. at 106–07.
41. In understanding the importance of the fraud prohibition, it makes sense to distinguish
between informational and fundamental efficiency. See, e.g., William K.S. Wang, Some
Arguments That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 344–49 (1986)
(defining informational efficiency as a state in which prices reflect all public information,
whereas “fundamental-valuation” efficiency is a state in which “prices are based on the rational
expectations of future payments to which the asset gives title”). A market is informationally
efficient if stock prices quickly incorporate available information. A market is fundamentally
efficient if stock prices accurately reflect the fundamental or true value of the stock. Mandatory
disclosure may be enough if the only concern is informationally efficient markets. But if
fundamental efficiency is the goal, a fraud prohibition is desirable to deter companies from
issuing false information that hinders the ability of the market to reflect the fundamental value
of the stock. To the extent that this Article refers to efficient markets, it is referring to markets
that are fundamentally efficient.
42. See Brudney, supra note 23, at 334.
43. Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New
Security Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613, 635 (1981).

OF A PURPOSE

PARK IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

356

10/17/2010 10:36:59 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:345

necessary to ensure that money moves to those who can use it most
effectively and that investors make optimal choices about the
44
contents of their portfolios.” An antifraud rule could reduce
verification costs and make it more costly for “low-quality firms to
45
mimic high-quality ones by making false disclosures.” John Coffee
cites empirical evidence that federal securities laws reduced price
dispersion and notes that the “most logical conclusion to draw from
this evidence is that allocative efficiency was enhanced and that
46
investors thereby benefited.”
The theoretical link between Rule 10b-5 and efficient markets
became embedded in doctrine with the Supreme Court’s 1988
47
decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. In Basic Inc., the Court adopted a
48
fraud-on-the-market theory, under which reliance on a fraudulent
misstatement relating to a publicly-traded company could be
presumed because, in an efficient market, a stock price would reflect
49
that misstatement. The Court observed that “[r]ecent empirical
studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that the market
price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly
50
available information, and hence, any material misrepresentations.”
The Court thus firmly linked Rule 10b-5 and its fraud prohibition to a
particular goal: the prevention of misrepresentations that might
51
distort an efficient market.
44. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 673.
45. Id. at 677.
46. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 735–36 (1984). But see Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice
of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 838–46 (1995) (arguing that antifraud liability
might reduce incentives to disclose).
47. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
48. Lower courts had adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory as early as 1975. See, e.g.,
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that an investor who purchases
stock on an exchange “relies generally on the supposition that the market price is validly set and
that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the
truth of the representations underlying the stock price—whether he is aware of it or not, the
price he pays reflects material misrepresentations”); see also Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern
Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 9
(1982) (discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1154–56 (1982) (discussing the assumption that market prices respond to
information that is or is not disseminated).
49. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241–49.
50. Id. at 246.
51. The Supreme Court’s use of the efficient-markets hypothesis in Basic Inc. has been
controversial. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (1990)
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Although there has been controversy over whether markets are
52
actually efficient, an antifraud rule that helps markets function
efficiently rather than dictating behavior of public companies is a
form of regulation attractive to those who do not typically favor
53
regulation. Thus, the antifraud rule has largely been spared the
extensive efficiency critiques that economists level at other regulatory
54
areas such as antitrust. Scholars continue to defend securities
55
regulation as an essential way of encouraging efficient markets. Rule
(“[The Court’s adoption of the efficient capital markets hypothesis] suffers from analytic flaws
that threaten to undermine its usefulness.”); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of
Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 623–25 (1992) (“[R]ejecting [fraud on the
market] and requiring individualized proof of reliance as a prerequisite to recovery under Rule
10b-5 would most closely approximate optimal deterrence.”).
52. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 857–72 (1992) (describing behavioral economics
critiques of the market-efficiency theory); Wang, supra note 41, at 344–49 (describing arguments
that markets are not fundamentally efficient); see also Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of
Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 613, 618 (1989) (arguing that the goal of efficient markets may be less important
than assumed because stock markets do not play a significant role in allocating resources).
53. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 669 (noting that “[t]here is very little
substantive regulation of investments” under the disclosure regime).
54. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 104–06 (1978) (discussing the “thoroughly misunderstood concept” of productive
efficiency).
55. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 229, 230 (2007) [hereinafter Coffee, Law and the Market] (“[H]igher enforcement
intensity gives the U.S. economy a lower cost of capital and higher securities valuations.”);
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market: The Tortured
Transition of Justifiable Reliance from Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 675
(1995) (“[F]raud-on-the-market is a desirable but incomplete development in securities fraud.”);
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE
L.J. 711, 713 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain efficient financial
markets . . . .”); see also Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate”
Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (noting that the purpose of securities regulation is
“to create stock markets in which the market price of a stock corresponds to its fundamental
value”).
That is not to say there has not been controversy over the desirability of the current
regime. Many have questioned whether the enforcement scheme is effective. See, e.g., John C.
Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1535–36 (2006) [hereinafter Coffee, Reforming]
(arguing that Rule 10b-5 actions fail to adequately deter individual managers). Critics have
argued that firms should have more flexibility in choosing the degree of disclosure they give to
investors. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 907 (1998) (recommending
a regulatory regime that “focuses on regulatory competition and gives issuers and investors the
ability to choose the law that governs their transactions”); Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2427 (1998)
(suggesting that firms should be permitted to select their own securities regulators).
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10b-5 is thus seen primarily as a rule that protects the efficiency of
markets.
B. Doctrinal Limits
Consistent with the view that Rule 10b-5 primarily encourages
efficient markets, courts for a time mostly interpreted Rule 10b-5 as a
narrow antifraud rule. This is not surprising, as the text of all three
56
subsections of Rule 10b-5 focuses on the existence of fraud.
57
Subsection (a) prohibits any “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”
Subsection (b) prohibits any “untrue statement of a material fact
or . . . [failure] to state a material fact” necessary to make a statement
58
not misleading. Subsection (c) prohibits “any act, practice, or course
59
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit.”
Although fraud is a notoriously broad concept and includes
60
many types of misconduct, the Supreme Court has used a narrow
conception of securities fraud in the context of Rule 10b-5 that is
consistent with the view that the primary purpose of Rule 10b-5 is to
promote efficient markets. This conception of Rule 10b-5 as an
61
antifraud rule is defined by at least three essential elements. First,
62
there must be a misrepresentation or omission. Second, the
misrepresentation or omission must be material, that is, significant to
63
the market or investors. Third, the material misrepresentation or
64
omission must be “in connection with” a securities transaction.
The requirement of a misrepresentation or omission ensures that
Rule 10b-5 is limited to disclosure-related conduct. Not all corporate
misconduct qualifies. For example, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
65
Green, the Supreme Court rejected a Rule 10b-5 claim brought by
56. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
57. Id. § 240.10b-5(a) (emphasis added).
58. Id. § 240.10b-5(b).
59. Id. § 240.10b-5(c) (emphasis added).
60. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (defining fraud broadly as
including “the act of embezzlement, which is the ‘fraudulent appropriation to one’s own use of
the money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another’” (quoting Grin v. Shane, 187 U.S. 181,
189 (1902))).
61. A complete list of the elements that must be alleged by a private plaintiff includes: (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter, (3) reliance, (4) causation, and (5)
damages. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
65. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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minority shareholders who were unhappy with the terms of a
66
proposed merger. The Second Circuit, in allowing the case to
proceed, held that Rule 10b-5 could reach “breaches of fiduciary duty
by a majority against minority shareholders without any charge of
67
misrepresentation or lack of disclosure.” The Second Circuit found
such a breach because the merger did not serve a proper business
68
purpose and was effected without proper notice to the shareholders.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that a breach of fiduciary duty
could not be the basis of a Rule 10b-5 claim without some “deception,
69
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure.”
In two decisions exemplifying this antifraud approach, the
Supreme Court focused on the absence of a specific
misrepresentation or omission in rejecting aiding and abetting liability
70
for Rule 10b-5 claims. In Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, the
Court reasoned that an aiding and abetting defendant cannot be
liable under Rule 10b-5 if it does not make a specific
71
misrepresentation or omission on which the plaintiff relies. In
72
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court
again rejected secondary liability because investors did not directly
73
rely on the secondary actor’s “acts or statements.”
In addition to the requirement that there be a misrepresentation
or omission, the materiality requirement of Rule 10b-5 ensures that
the misrepresentation or omission is relevant to the market.
Materiality requires that “disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
74
the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” A company might
deceive the market or investors with respect to trivial matters, but
such conduct is not actionable under Rule 10b-5. It is only when a
misrepresentation or omission affects the functioning of a market that
the conduct triggers the antifraud rule.

66. Id. at 464–65, 475, 479–80.
67. Id. at 469–70.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 476.
70. Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
71. Id. at 180.
72. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
73. Id. at 769–70.
74. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Finally, to fall within the scope of Rule 10b-5, the questioned
conduct must be “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a
75
security. Read in conjunction with the requirement that there be a
misrepresentation that is material, the “in connection” requirement
helps ensure that Rule 10b-5 does not cover conduct without a nexus
to investors or the markets. Rather than regulating all misconduct
that happens to relate to the securities industry, an antifraud reading
of the “in connection” requirement directs Rule 10b-5 at conduct that
76
hinders the ability of markets to price securities.
II. RULE 10B-5, INSIDER TRADING, AND THE
UNJUST ENRICHMENT PRINCIPLE
Despite the theoretical and doctrinal power of the portrayal of
Rule 10b-5 as an antifraud rule that promotes efficient markets, there
is one area of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence that is difficult to reconcile
with that narrative. As discussed in this Part, the prohibition of
insider trading by Rule 10b-5 fits uneasily with the view that Rule
10b-5 is directed primarily at fraud. Although the classical theory of
insider trading tried to conceptualize insider trading as a fraudulent
failure to disclose by insiders, the Supreme Court’s adoption of the
misappropriation theory in O’Hagan makes it clear that insider
trading doctrine reflects an unjust enrichment principle. This Part
describes how Rule 10b-5 evolved from a narrow focus on fraud to a
broader focus on unjust enrichment through the development of
insider trading doctrine.
A. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading
The quintessential example of insider trading involves an
individual who has obtained important information about a company
that is not available to the public. When that information becomes
publicly known, the company’s stock price will move significantly
higher (or lower). The individual can profit from such information by
purchasing (or selling) the stock before the information is released.
Rule 10b-5 has been the primary basis for prohibiting insider
77
trading. As this Section shows, this prohibition has been criticized on
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
76. For an early discussion of how courts interpreted the “in connection” requirement, see
generally Barbara Black, The Second Circuit’s Approach to the “In Connection With”
Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 539 (1988).
77. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (prohibiting insider trading relating to tender offers).
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two grounds: (1) insider trading does not harm investors and may
even make markets more accurate, and (2) insider trading doctrine is
not a fraud that fits within the scope of Rule 10b-5.
1. The Efficient-Markets Critique of the Insider Trading
Prohibition. As discussed earlier, Henry Manne criticizes the insider
trading prohibition on the ground that insider trading facilitates the
78
transfer of information to efficient markets. Unlike the typical
securities fraud case, in which a company misleads investors about its
condition, causing them to purchase stock at inflated prices, it is
79
difficult to trace just whom insider trading directly harms. And if
insider trading makes markets operate more efficiently, the benefits
of allowing insider trading might outweigh the harm.

78. See supra Part I.A; see also Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 868 (1983) (reasoning that communicating information
through insider trading gives firms power to control information contained in the share price).
However, there is little empirical support for the market-efficiency argument. See Stephen
Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L.
REV. 35, 63–65 (1986) (noting the ambiguity of the evidence supporting the market-efficiency
justification for insider trading); James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical
Response to the “Chicago School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 648 (“Manne’s thesis has no reliable
support in either theory or empirical data.” (footnote omitted)).
Manne also argues that insider trading might be a way of compensating managers. See
MANNE, supra note 32, at 111–58. A problem with such an arrangement might be that an
executive compensated in this way would have an incentive to increase the volatility of the stock
to exploit his access to inside information. See, e.g., Cox, supra, at 636–37 (discussing possible
ways in which insiders might manipulate disclosures or corporate activities to benefit
themselves); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332 (“The opportunity to gain from
insider trading also may induce managers to increase the volatility of the firm’s stock prices.”).
79. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 78, at 635 (“[T]he regulation of insider trading cannot be
justified out of concern for protecting the unwary investor.”); Dooley, supra note 25, at 31 (“It is
difficult, however, to draw a convincing, or even plausible, causal connection between the
insider trading and the market losses experienced by other investors.”); Kimberly D. Krawiec,
Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the
Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 468 (2001) (“Despite the best efforts of scholars to
prove otherwise, it has long been recognized that many investors are unaffected, or even
benefited, by insider trading.”).
William Wang has set forth a novel theory of how investors can be harmed by insider
trading. See William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal
Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1217 (1981). According to Wang, “[w]ith a purchase of an existing issue of securities,
someone ultimately requires more of that issue; with a sale of an existing issue, someone
ultimately acquires more of that issue.” Id. at 1235. Wang acknowledges, however, that it is
difficult to identify precisely which investors are harmed by insider trading. See id. at 1238
(“[T]he Law of Conservation of Securities indicates that although an inside trade does harm
specific individuals, identifying them is almost impossible.”).
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One response to Manne’s argument has been that if insider
trading is rampant, investors will not have confidence in the market
80
and will fail to invest. Victor Brudney argues that the prohibition
against insider trading is grounded on remedying unfair informational
81
advantages. An insider who trades based on information that the
public cannot access has an unfair advantage because “he has a lawful
82
monopoly on access to the information involved.” To the extent that
a trader, whether an insider or outsider, has an “informational
advantage that the public is unable lawfully to overcome or offset,” it
83
is unfair to allow the trader to exploit such an advantage. An insider
trading prohibition remedies informational asymmetries, making
investors feel comfortable that the markets are not stacked against
84
them.
80. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 23, at 356 (stating that a rational buyer will either refrain
from dealing or demand a risk premium if he knows that the party with whom he is conducting
business has a material advantage).
81. Id. at 338 (“The effort is to deny the possessor an informational advantage in trading
with other investors more than to inform the latter about the state of the world in order to
facilitate their investment decisions generally.”).
82. Id. at 346. Professor Saul Levmore also defines fairness with respect to insider trading
broadly, arguing that “fairness is achieved when insiders and outsiders are in equal positions.”
Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV.
117, 122 (1982).
The asymmetry may even be more unjust because the insider has access to the
information solely by reason of his position rather than because he does productive work in
uncovering the information. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information,
and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1978) (distinguishing between information
that is deliberately found and information that is casually discovered).
83. Brudney, supra note 23, at 360. Of course, Brudney would not prohibit traders from
exploiting lawful asymmetries of information. See id. at 361–63.
84. See id. at 357 (“[I]n its effort to restore faith in the securities market, Congress
concluded that [insider] informational advantages should be denied.”). The Supreme Court in
O’Hagan relied in part on Brudney’s conception of fairness in justifying the prohibition against
insider trading. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997) (citing Brudney, supra
note 23, at 356).
The notion that insider trading is unfair is widespread. See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 25,
at 43 (“Every argument in favor of regulating insider trading proceeds from the crucial assertion
that it is such a deviation from generally accepted standards of conduct that it is morally
wrong.”). As the SEC noted in Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668,
40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961), the prohibition against such trading is based in part on “the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of [inside] information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.” Id. at 912. Justice Blackmun in particular
subscribed to a fairness theory of insider trading. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
248 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing in his dissent that insider trading is “inherently
unfair”); see also Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 233 (1991) (“The successful inside trader has won the lottery
without buying a ticket.”).
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A problem with the investor-confidence theory is that it is almost
85
impossible to test empirically. Whereas the market impact of
fraudulent information is commonly measurable by examining stock
price movements after the fraud is admitted, there is not a
comparable test for measuring the impact of insider trading on
investor behavior. Moreover, if insider trading is done discreetly, the
public may not perceive that the markets are stacked against them.
As a result, it is difficult to link insider trading to a general lack of
confidence in the markets. The investor-confidence case for
prohibiting insider trading seems more tenuous than the case for
prohibiting fraud.
2. Insider Trading as Fraud? In addition to the difficulty of
justifying a ban on insider trading as necessary for efficient markets,
many have questioned how insider trading can be considered a fraud
prohibited by Rule 10b-5. It is difficult to say that an individual
investor can defraud the market simply by purchasing or selling stock
86
on the open market. No representation occurs when an investor
87
makes the purchase. Even if the act of purchasing or selling stock
can be read as a signal of what the investor believes the stock is
worth, most such purchases are not large enough to significantly
88
affect the market price of a publicly traded stock.
Rather than basing insider trading liability on an affirmative
misrepresentation, the classical theory of insider trading bases the
prohibition on a fraudulent failure to disclose. Fraud liability for

85. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 78, at 63–65 (describing the lack of empirical evidence
about the impact of insider trading).
86. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 10, at 52 (“The open-market insider trading
prohibition does not fit comfortably within the fraud and deception framework of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5.”); see also Easterbrook, supra note 78, at 318 (“A considerable distortion of
language underlies any holding that trading in a market without issuing a press release is ‘fraud’
or ‘deceit.’”). But see Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1225 (1998) (arguing that
investors are defrauded by insider trading).
87. See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 25, at 59 (“[I]nsider trading in no way resembles deceit. No
representation is made, nor is there reliance, change of position, or causal connection between
the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s losses.”).
88. Of course, this assumes that the market does not infer the existence of inside
information from the trades. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 78, at 635 (“The investor’s decision to sell
or purchase is unaffected by whether the insider is also secretly buying or selling shares in the
open market.”); Easterbrook, supra note 78, at 336 (“The insider’s trading thus may lead to
price adjustments, but only to the extent the insider’s secret has leaked to the market or been
inferred by traders.”).
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nondisclosure can only attach when there is a duty to make a
89
disclosure. Such a duty to disclose exists for directors and officers of
a corporation who have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their
shareholders. As fiduciaries of the shareholders, directors and officers
90
cannot profit at the expense of shareholders without disclosure.
Insider trading enriches directors at the expense of the shareholders
with whom they trade. Rule 10b-5 has thus been read to subject
91
insiders to what has been called the “disclose-or-abstain” rule. That
is, an insider must either disclose any insider information or abstain
92
from trading.
Thus, for a time, the courts linked securities fraud and fiduciary
duty in the context of insider trading liability. Despite providing a
convincing rationale for the prohibition, the incorporation of
fiduciary duty concepts is in tension with the idea that Rule 10b-5 is
primarily an antifraud rule. As the Supreme Court held in Santa Fe

89. As the Supreme Court has observed, “one who fails to disclose material information
prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do
so.” Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
90. Of course, the duty arguably does not extend to future shareholders, though it would
be arbitrary to protect present shareholders while not protecting future shareholders. See, e.g.,
id. at 227 n.8 (noting that merely selling stock to an individual may create a fiduciary relation to
the buyer).
91. The SEC was the first to recognize such a rule with respect to insiders. See In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 911 (Nov. 8, 1961) (“We,
and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known
to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and
which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.”). The courts soon followed. See, e.g.,
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (“[J]udicial interpretations have established that silence in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b) despite
the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of
nondisclosure.”); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848–49 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(“[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it . . . or . . . must
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities . . . .”).
In addition, lawyers, accountants, and consultants to the company can be considered
“constructive insiders” who are also subject to the disclose-or-abstain rule. See Dirks v. SEC,
465 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983) (“The basis for recognizing [an outsider’s] fiduciary duty is . . . that
they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the
enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes.”).
92. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (noting that under the
classical theory of insider trading, Rule 10b-5 confers a duty to disclose inside information or
abstain from trading); In re Refco Capital Mkts., Ltd. Brokerage Customer Sec. Litig., No. 06
Civ. 643, 2007 WL 2694469, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2007) (“Another kind of securities fraud
claim is based on conduct that is deceptive because it is inconsistent with a fiduciary duty. In
claims of this kind, the fiduciary duty serves as a sort of standing false representation by the
fraudster, who deceives the victim by violating the commitment associated with her fiduciary
duty.”).
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Industries, Inc. v. Green, a breach of a fiduciary duty by itself does not
93
give rise to a cause of action under Rule 10b-5. Profiting at the
expense of shareholders, although it violates fiduciary duties, does
94
not necessarily affirmatively defraud those shareholders. On the
other hand, covert trading on secret information by insiders can be
characterized as deceptive, so it might be differentiated from the
nondeceptive breach of fiduciary duty in Santa Fe Industries.
Though insider trading involves an omission, such an omission is
not material in the same sense in which a fraudulent statement or
omission in the company’s financial statements can be material.
Although inside information is material in that if it were revealed, the
stock price would be altered, the act of trading on that information
before it is revealed does not necessarily affect the stock price if the
trading is discreet and modest in amount. Any deception by the
insider relates to his particular duties to shareholders of the company
rather than any broader duty to the market. Thus, it is difficult to
argue that insider trading is like a fraud on the market.
Even if the failure to disclose harms the market, one
commentator notes that under current case law, an insider could
theoretically remedy that deficiency by disclosing to the market that
95
he will trade on inside information. Although it is unlikely that such
candid insider trading would be implemented in practice, the
argument demonstrates that fraud does not provide a complete
explanation for why insider trading is wrong. If an insider can remedy
the harm of nondisclosure by making a simple disclosure of the intent
96
to trade on inside information, the prohibition seems trivial. Though
the courts and the SEC claim to be simply applying the antifraud rule
in promulgating a disclose-or-abstain rule, the reality is that the
97
prohibition is at least partly motivated by other considerations.

93. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (“[T]he cases do not
support the proposition . . . that a breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without any
deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, violates the statute and the Rule.”).
94. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 84, at 192–94 (noting that a breach of fiduciary duty to
shareholders is not necessarily deceptive).
95. See Prakash, supra note 10, at 1507 (“A careful examination of several cases and
examples . . . help[s] prove the admittedly counterintuitive claim that Candid Insider Trading
does not run afoul of Rule 10b-5.”).
96. See id. at 1516–17 (arguing that even a “modest disclosure” or “a one-time, blanket
statement of intent to trade” might avoid the prohibition of deception).
97. See, e.g., WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 10, § 3:5.2 (“The public perception is that
much stock market insider trading unjustly enriches the information possessor. This enrichment
results from the trade rather than from the nondisclosure.”).
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In addition, the classical theory allows for a substantial amount
of trading on nonpublic information. If an individual is not a
fiduciary, there is no fiduciary duty to disclose. In Chiarella v. United
States, the Supreme Court reviewed the criminal conviction of a
noninsider, Chiarella, who worked for a company that printed
98
announcements of corporate takeover bids.
Chiarella used
information from the documents to trade in the companies that would
99
be subject to such bids. Initially, Chiarella was convicted on a theory
of fraudulent nondisclosure set forth in a jury charge that “permitted
the jury to convict the petitioner if it found that he willfully failed to
inform sellers of target company securities that he knew of a
forthcoming takeover bid that would make their shares more
100
valuable.” The Court overturned the conviction because Chiarella
was not an officer or director of any of the companies whose stock he
traded and thus had no duty of disclosure to the shareholders of those
101
companies.
3. Unjust Enrichment as a Basis for the Insider Trading
Prohibition. Despite its focus on fiduciary duty, Chiarella also laid
the foundation for an unjust enrichment rationale for prohibiting
insider trading. In his Chiarella dissent, Chief Justice Warren Burger
argued that Chiarella’s conduct should trigger liability because it
“quite clearly serves no useful function except his own enrichment at
102
the expense of others.” Burger thus urged the Court to adopt a
103
misappropriation theory that would cover noninsiders. Soon after

98. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 226.
101. Id. at 231 (“Petitioner’s use of that information was not a fraud under § 10 (b) unless he
was subject to an affirmative duty to disclose it before trading.”).
102. Id. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Langevoort, supra note 10, at 2 (“Persons
in a position to have special access to confidential information bearing on the value of a security
are perceived as being unjustly enriched when they trade with others who are unable to discover
that information.”).
103. In a later case, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), the Court used unjust enrichment
language in determining when someone can be liable for receiving inside information from an
insider. Such a receiver of information, or tippee, can only be liable for insider trading if the
tipper breached a fiduciary duty to shareholders and the tippee knew or should have known of
the breach. Id. at 660. To determine whether there is a fiduciary breach by the insider who
passes on information, “the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure.” Id. at 662. Thus, Dirks centers liability for disclosing insider
information on a personal benefit gained by an insider—unjust enrichment. See, e.g., United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 663 (1997) (noting that there was no liability in Dirks because
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the Court’s decision in Chiarella, a number of commentators argued
that the insider trading prohibition could be rooted in an unjust
104
enrichment principle.
A few years after Chiarella, Robert Thompson focused on the
concept of restitution in making an unjust enrichment case against
105
insider trading. Thompson explains that the scope of Rule 10b-5 can
be better understood by distinguishing between “tort principles
measuring harm to the plaintiff and unjust enrichment principles
106
measuring gain to the defendant.” Thompson cites a notable First
107
Circuit decision from 1965, Janigan v. Taylor, which couched its
decision in a securities fraud case in unjust enrichment language,
stating: “it is simple equity that a wrongdoer should disgorge his
108
fraudulent enrichment.” Thompson noted that the prohibition of
insider trading is better explained as an example of restitution rather
109
than compensation. For insider trading cases, “the guiding principle

“[t]he insiders had acted not for personal profit, but to expose a massive fraud within the
corporation”).
104. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 10, at 26 (“After all, the primary justification for the
abstain-or-disclose rule in open-market trading is avoidance of unjust enrichment . . . .”);
Thompson, supra note 10, at 396 (“[T]he prohibition [against insider trading] is aimed at
preventing insiders’ unjust enrichment.”).
105. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 397–98 (“Unjust enrichment as a separate theory of
recovery . . . provides a better foundation to consider the more difficult problems raised in
open-market insider trading cases.”).
106. Id. at 356. Restitution has long been recognized as a legitimate remedy for securities
fraud. In its 1972 decision Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the
Supreme Court recognized that a plaintiff bringing a securities fraud action could argue for
damages based on either the plaintiff’s loss or the defendant’s gain from the fraud. Id. at 154–55.
If “the defendant received more than the seller’s actual loss,” the “damages are the amount of
the defendant’s profit.” Id. at 155; see also Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661–62 (1986)
(recognizing a restitution remedy for Rule 10b-5 cases); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 634 (1985) (“‘Injury’ and
‘restitution’ are the competing paradigms of damages in securities law.”).
Restitution has often been linked to unjust enrichment. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d
1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting in a Rule 10b-5 case that “restitution merely forces the
defendant to give up to the trustee the amount by which he was unjustly enriched”); SEC v.
Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc. 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Disgorgement of profits in an
action brought by the SEC to enjoin violations of the securities laws appears to [be an equitable
remedy]; the court is not awarding damages to which plaintiff is legally entitled but is exercising
the chancellor’s discretion to prevent unjust enrichment.”); Peter B. Oh, Tracing, 80 TUL. L.
REV. 849, 880 (2006) (noting that restitution can be a way of remedying unjust enrichment).
107. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965).
108. Id. at 786.
109. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 391–97 (arguing for the superiority of the restitution
explanation in explaining the insider trading prohibition). Donald Langevoort has revived the
possibility of using restitution as a means of securities fraud enforcement. Donald C.
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is to make the defendant give back that which he obtained by
invasion of the plaintiff’s interest whether or not that gain equals the
110
plaintiff’s loss.”
Donald Langevoort, in analyzing the Chiarella decision, makes
an unjust enrichment case against insider trading rooted in what he
111
calls the fiduciary principle. Because insiders owe fiduciary duties of
loyalty and disclosure to shareholders, Langevoort observes that
“[r]equiring public disclosure by the insider in the open-market
situation furthers a significant objective underlying the fiduciary
112
disclosure rule—that of preventing unjust enrichment.” In analyzing
whether insider trading outside of the insider context should be
prohibited, Langevoort argues that “[a]s a matter of preventing unjust
enrichment, . . . a duty to disclose is clearly called for when the
information advantage derives from unlawful acquisition or use of the
113
information.”
Chief Justice Burger and Professors Thompson and Langevoort
all expressed the common-sense intuition that insider trading involves
114
unjust enrichment. The problem, though, was reconciling an unjust
enrichment view with doctrine that more and more viewed Rule
Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”:
Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630 (2007) (“[M]y attention in this Article is on equitable
remedies—especially rescission and restitution—as underutilized tools in securities fraud
enforcement.”).
Easterbrook and Fischel argue for an application of restitution that would limit Rule
10b-5’s impact. They claim that restitution, rather than compensation measured by the market
decline suffered by shareholders, is the optimal damages measure for securities fraud. In openmarket securities fraud cases, for every person who loses by buying stock inflated by fraud there
is a person who gains by selling stock inflated by fraud, so the gains and losses from securities
fraud cancel each other out. Thus, damages that measure the net harm to investors may not be
meaningful. Instead, the optimal damages may be some measure of the profits captured by the
person perpetrating the fraud—in other words, restitution. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
106, at 634, 641–42.
110. Thompson, supra note 10, at 393.
111. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 19.
112. Id.; see also Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary’s Duty of Loyalty, 84
LAW Q. REV. 472, 476 (1968) (“[I]t is all too evident that the dishonest fiduciary has been
unjustly enriched. . . . [H]e has received a benefit (his profit), . . . gained it at his principal’s
expense (by exploiting his position of trust), and . . . it would be unjust to allow him to retain that
benefit.”).
113. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 52.
114. The intuition that insider trading is immoral is longstanding. See MANNE, supra note
32, at 3 (“The absence of any accepted economic tools for analyzing this subject made the
insider-trading area a fertile one for the lawyers’ equity approach with its overtones of fairness
and morality.”).
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10b-5 as an antifraud rule. Despite its intuitive appeal, the argument
that an unjust enrichment principle explained the insider trading
prohibition had an uncertain status for almost twenty years.
B. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: Triumph of the
Unjust Enrichment Principle
Chiarella’s adoption of the classical theory of insider trading
would leave a significant amount of insider trading unregulated. If
insider trading is viewed solely as a fraud, it might only cover insiders
with special fiduciary duties, leaving uncovered those who profit from
misappropriated information but have no fiduciary relationship to the
company’s shareholders. As this Section describes, in United States v.
O’Hagan, the Supreme Court extended the prohibition beyond
fiduciary relationships to cover misappropriators lacking a fiduciary
duty to the traded company’s shareholders, moving the Rule 10b-5
prohibition against insider trading further from the antifraud rule and
closer to the unjust enrichment principle.
1. United States v. O’Hagan. O’Hagan was a case involving an
inside trader who did not owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of
the corporation whose stock he traded. O’Hagan was an attorney for
115
a firm that represented an acquirer of another company. Although
O’Hagan and his firm owed a duty to the acquirer, O’Hagan owed no
fiduciary duty to the target company, and he traded on inside
116
information relating to the target. In affirming the conviction of
O’Hagan for insider trading, the Supreme Court adopted what it
117
called the misappropriation theory,
which was “designed to
‘protec[t] the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by
118
outsiders.’”
Under the misappropriation theory, a noninsider is liable for
insider trading if he misappropriates information from a source to
which he owes some duty of confidentiality. Rather than “premising

115. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997).
116. See id. (describing O’Hagan’s role at his law firm and illustrating that he had no role in
the negotiations or with the target company).
117. Id. at 653–54 (“We agree with the Government that misappropriation . . . satisfies
§ 10(b)’s requirement that chargeable conduct involve a ‘deceptive device or contrivance’ used
‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of securities.”).
118. Id. at 653 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for the United States at 14, United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842), 1997 WL 86306) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and
purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the misappropriation
theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of
119
those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.”
O’Hagan violated this rule because he deceived the source of the
information, his law firm, to which he owed a duty of
120
confidentiality.
O’Hagan is unclear with respect to the source and scope of this
duty of nondeception. Indeed, the Court was unclear about what to
call the duty, introducing the term “agency” as an additional
descriptor of the type of relationship that could trigger insider trading
121
obligations. For example, the Court cited to the Restatement
(Second) of Agency relating to an “agent’s disclosure obligation
122
regarding use of confidential information.” Though O’Hagan was a
123
partner with fiduciary duties to his other partners, and the Court at
124
times uses the language of fiduciary duty, the Court also stated that
liability would be appropriate for a mere employee of the Wall Street
125
Journal. Thus, the misappropriation theory appears to range wider
than fiduciary relationships to shareholders, extending to any
principal-agent relationship in which information is conveyed with an
126
expectation of confidentiality.
2. Misappropriation as a Departure from the Antifraud
Conception of Rule 10b-5. By broadening Rule 10b-5 to encompass
119. Id. at 652.
120. See id. at 653 (approving the government’s misappropriation theory set forth in the
indictment, which alleged “that O’Hagan, in breach of a duty of trust and confidence he owed to
his law firm, Dorsey & Whitney, and to its client, Grand Met, traded on the basis of nonpublic
information”).
121. See, e.g., id. at 661 (referring to a lack of “agency or other fiduciary relationship”).
122. Id. at 654–55 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 390, 395 (1958)).
123. Id. at 647, 653 (noting that O’Hagan was a partner at Dorsey & Whitney and owed the
firm a “duty of trust and confidence”).
124. Id. at 647, 652, 655 (discussing § 10(b) violations as “breach[es] of a fiduciary duty,”
“breach[es] of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality,” and “breach[es] of a duty of loyalty”).
125. See id. at 654 (citing with approval the imposition of liability for misappropriation in
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)).
126. See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy
for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 15 (1998) (“The Court’s decision in O’Hagan
breaks new ground in establishing a foundation for insider trading based on common law agency
principles, thereby departing from Powell’s vision of the scope of insider trading prohibited by
§10(b).”); see also Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary
Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1340–46 (2009) (documenting the trend of courts finding
insider trading in the absence of fiduciary duty post-O’Hagan).
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agency relationships other than the fiduciary relationship between
insiders and shareholders, the misappropriation theory runs further
127
from an antifraud and efficient-markets conception of Rule 10b-5.
Although the classical theory could purport to ground the prohibition
in a duty to disclose owed to shareholders, the duty at stake in
O’Hagan was a duty to a law firm. A law firm is not a direct market
participant and certainly cannot be said to be the market. In contrast
to the typical fraud-on-the-market case, in which there is a direct link
between a deception and the market, a misappropriation insidertrading case involves conduct that has at best a tenuous link to the
market.
Though the Court attempted to frame the misappropriation
theory as fraud by noting that “[d]eception through nondisclosure is
128
central to the theory of liability,”
the deception by a
misappropriator is of a different kind than a typical fraudulent
nondisclosure relating to a security that harms investors. As many
commentators have noted, the deception in a misappropriation case is
129
directed at the source of the information rather than at the market.
The O’Hagan Court read the requirement that a deception be “in
connection with” a securities transaction broadly, noting that the
phase does not require “deception of an identifiable purchaser or
130
seller.” Rather than requiring the deception to be directed at the

127. The Supreme Court acknowledged that disclosure would eliminate any element of
fraud with respect to a misappropriation. Under O’Hagan, “full disclosure forecloses liability
under the misappropriation theory,” O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655, implying that candid insider
trading is permissible. Indeed, the Court states that an agent could avoid Rule 10b-5 liability by
disclosing his intent to trade on insider information to the principal. Id.; see also Prakash, supra
note 10, at 1510–16 (observing that O’Hagan appears to allow for candid insider trading).
128. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654.
129. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Kimberley D. Krawiec & Cynthia A. Williams, Don’t
Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 190 (1998)
(noting that misappropriation theory “turns not on effects on the marketplace or on potential
damage to selling or purchasing shareholders, but rather on a duty owed to the source of the
information, regardless of whether that source is a buyer or seller of securities”); Prakash, supra
note 10, at 1533 (noting that after O’Hagan “Rule 10b-5 now regulates deceptions of parties
unconnected to the securities markets”); Pritchard, supra note 126, at 44 (“[T]here is no
principled way to limit the misappropriation theory to market participants.”).
130. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658. This language is consistent with an earlier case in which the
Court made it clear that Section 10(b) “is not limited to preserving the integrity of the securities
markets.” Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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market or investors, O’Hagan only requires that the deception
131
“coincide” with a particular securities transaction.
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan also rejected a narrow reading
of its decision in Central Bank, which the lower appeals court had
read as imposing a requirement that a Rule 10b-5 claim be based on a
132
specific misrepresentation or omission relied upon by investors. The
Court found that there was no such requirement and that its rejection
of aiding and abetting liability in Central Bank was based primarily on
133
“policy considerations.” In clarifying that Rule 10b-5 does not
require a specific misrepresentation or omission, the Court rejected a
strict antifraud conception of Rule 10b-5 and set the foundation for
unjust enrichment claims based on a broader range of deceptive
conduct.
In addition to an agency theory, O’Hagan also seems to base the
134
insider trading prohibition on a property-rights theory.
The

131. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus
coincide.”).
132. Id. at 664 (“The Eighth Circuit isolated the [Court’s] statement . . . and drew from it the
conclusion that § 10(b) covers only deceptive statements or omissions on which purchasers and
sellers, and perhaps other market participants, rely. It is evident . . . , however, that this
Court . . . sought only to clarify that secondary actors, although not subject to aiding and
abetting liability, remain subject to primary liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for certain
conduct.” (citation omitted)); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761, 769 (2008) (“If this conclusion were read to suggest there must be a specific oral or
written statement before there could be liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, it would be
erroneous.”).
133. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 664–65 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
134. The idea that insider trading may violate the property rights of the corporation dates
back to at least the 1920s. See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., Publicity of Accounts and Directors’
Purchases of Stock, 25 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (1927) (noting the theory that “the detailed
information of a director was the property of the corporation, and could not be used for his own
benefit”). Modern scholars have often made this argument as well. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading
Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1252–57 (1995) (arguing that federal insider-trading
law protects the exclusive rights of a corporation to nonpublic information); Carlton & Fischel,
supra note 78, at 865–66 (relying on “[t]he notion that the dispute concerning insider trading is
really a dispute about which party more highly values a property right”); Krawiec, supra note
79, at 449 (“The recognition that many of the fundamental issues in securities regulation
essentially reduce to a matter of allocating property rights in valuable information is one of the
greatest contributions of law and economics scholars to the securities law literature in recent
years.”); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 11 (1984) (“[P]rivileged corporate information is a
valuable asset in the nature of a property interest.”); Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the
Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 80 (1987) (describing “inside information
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O’Hagan Court observed that “[a] company’s confidential
information . . . qualifies as property to which the company has a right
135
of exclusive use.” A property-rights theory would be a clear break
from an antifraud approach to Rule 10b-5. The property-rights theory
does not hinge upon whether someone has been misled, but instead
implies that any unauthorized use of property would trigger
136
liability. Though the misappropriation of property can also be
fraudulent (an individual can take property through a
misrepresentation), such misappropriation does not have to involve
an affirmative misrepresentation or omission: the property is simply
taken.
If inside information is viewed as a theft of corporate property,
the scope of the insider trading prohibition might be both expanded
and narrowed. It would be expanded because the prohibition would
not be conditioned on the existence of a fiduciary or agency
137
relationship. On the other hand, if inside information is the
property of the corporation, nothing prevents corporations from
contracting with insiders to allow them to trade on nonpublic
information, thus narrowing the reach of the insider trading
138
prohibition. But given the unlikelihood that insider trading would
as property that can be owned and used by or for the benefit of the owner or creator of that
property”).
135. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25–27 (1987)).
The SEC opinion introducing the federal prohibition of insider trading, In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961), can be understood in
part as advancing a “business property” theory. The prohibition arises in part from “the
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.” Id. at 912;
see also Easterbrook, supra note 78, at 321 (noting that Cady, Roberts & Co. is rooted partly in
the “business property” theory).
136. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 134, at 101 (“All that the plaintiff must establish is that he
or she owned (or had rights in) the information, that those ownership or other rights were
infringed by the defendant, and that the plaintiff suffered damage.”).
137. See, e.g., Nagy, supra note 126, at 1340–44 (describing cases in which misappropriation
theory has been extended to thefts of inside information by individuals without connection to
the corporation).
138. For some critics, the possibility of authorizing insider trading by contracting is a
problem of the property-rights theory. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 84, at 225–26 (“[V]iewing
inside information as property justifies treating the misappropriation of that property as theft
but correspondingly requires the government to defer to firm decisions contractually allocating
the entitlement to that property.”). For proponents of the theory, the property-rights theory is
attractive for the very same reason. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 78, at 866–72
(describing reasons why corporations might want to contract with managers to allow insider
trading); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW.
U. L. REV. 1449, 1467–68 (1987) (arguing that corporations should be permitted to opt out of
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139

be widely authorized, on balance, a property-rights theory would
prohibit a broader range of conduct than the classical theory.
C. Elements of the Unjust Enrichment Principle
By regulating deceptions that run afoul of agency duties or
infringe on the property rights of the corporation, the Supreme Court
has created a second broad category of concern for Rule 10b-5: cases
of unjust enrichment. The fiduciary-duty, agency, and property-rights
theories all have elements that allude to the unjust enrichment
principle. As Langevoort notes in commenting on Chiarella, when a
fiduciary trades on inside information, his failure to disclose is unjust
140
enrichment. Similarly, an agency theory might couch the wrong
more broadly as an agent profiting from access to information at the
141
expense of the principal. The property-rights theory formulates the
wrong as enriching oneself by misappropriating information that
142
belongs to the corporation.
At the same time, after O’Hagan, the unjust enrichment
principle captures the prohibition against insider trading better than
any of these three concepts alone. Fiduciary duty does not cover the
conduct of outsiders, which O’Hagan partly covers through agency
143
law.
Agency theory would not include misappropriations of

insider trading prohibitions to contract with risk-taking managers); Krawiec, supra note 79, at
498–99 (proposing that insider trading by outsiders should be regulated primarily by private
enforcement of contract law).
139. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that corporations would be willing to permit their
managers to trade in a way that hurts their shareholders. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 126, at
46 (stating reasons why corporations are unlikely to allow insider trading). In addition, allowing
parties to contract with respect to insider trading is problematic because it is difficult to assess
the costs and benefits of allowing insiders to trade. E.g., Cox, supra note 78, at 653–55.
140. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 6–27; see also Elliot J. Weiss, United States v. O’Hagan:
Pragmatism Returns to the Law of Insider Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 395, 398–400 (1998) (citing
common law cases prohibiting insider trading as unjust enrichment by a fiduciary).
141. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 84, at 190 (“[A]gency law suggests that a corporate insider is
unjustly enriched by making use of corporate information for his personal benefit and that any
trading profits are rightfully the property of the owner of the information—the corporation.
This unjust enrichment takes place . . . whether or not the insider discloses the information prior
to trading.”).
142. See, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the
Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 509 (1980)
(“[R]estitution may be justified on the general principle that a person who obtains—though not
necessarily tortiously—a benefit at the expense of another through appropriation of a property
or quasi-property interest held by the other person is unjustly enriched and should be liable to
the other for any benefit attributable to the appropriation.”).
143. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654–55 (1997).
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property by nonagents that would be actionable under a propertyrights theory.
Although the property-rights theory is broadly inclusive, it does
not explain the insider trading prohibition after O’Hagan as well as
the unjust enrichment principle. There are difficulties with thinking of
Rule 10b-5 as a property rights rule. Even if inside information is
property, Rule 10b-5 does not regulate all of its uses. The theft of
inside information alone would not trigger Rule 10b-5. Such a theft
would likely only be covered by state law. The thief must trade on the
144
inside information for profit to trigger Rule 10b-5. In other words, it
is the enrichment that matters most, not the taking of the inside
information. If Rule 10b-5 were truly a property rights rule, it would
145
also cover the theft of inside information.
The idea of insider trading as unjust enrichment has been
146
controversial. Even outside the securities law context, unjust
147
enrichment has a shaky existence because of its vagueness. A
number of commentators have highlighted the fact that unjust
enrichment has not received the same attention as other more clearly
148
defined torts. It is common to think of unjust enrichment as a
149
substantive basis for liability, but the substance of the principle is
144. See, e.g., id. at 656 (“[T]he fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary
gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the
information to purchase or sell securities.”).
145. Some might characterize unjust enrichment as simply a fairness argument. Although
the unjust enrichment principle is a type of fairness argument, it is a specific type of fairness
argument that focuses particularly on personal enrichment.
146. See Strudler & Orts, supra note 3, at 375–76 & n.4 (discussing the “struggle[s]” of
“[c]ourts and commentators” to form a “coherent answer” for why insider trading is wrong); see
also id. at 404–08 (discussing the merits of using unjust enrichment to explain why insider
trading is wrong).
147. See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 142, at 504 (“[Unjust enrichment] has on occasion been
regarded as too indefinite and vague to be recognized as a general legal principle, with concern
expressed that its adoption might undermine legal stability, confuse legal thinking, and
jeopardize clear, systematic organization of the law.” (footnote omitted)); Emily Sherwin,
Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083,
2106–07 (2001) (“[W]hat makes unjust enrichment both powerful and dangerous when
interpreted as a legal principle is its open-endedness.”).
148. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Christopher Serkin, Revaluing Restitution: From the Talmud
to Postsocialism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1385 (1999) (“Whatever happened to the study of
restitution?”); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV.
1277, 1277 (1989) (“Despite its importance, restitution is a relatively neglected and
underdeveloped part of the law.”).
149. See, e.g., 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 552 (2d ed. 1993) (“Unjust enrichment
has both a substantive and a remedial aspect.”); Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful
Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1767, 1779–81 (2001) (arguing that unjust enrichment can support
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150

vague. The Restatement of Restitution, which refers to the principle
of unjust enrichment, declines to define it, referring to it as a “term of
art” and simply stating that “[a] person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to
151
the other.”
Regardless of its questionable pedigree in other legal contexts,
after O’Hagan, the contours of a substantive unjust enrichment
principle rooted in Rule 10b-5 have begun to emerge. First, rather
than requiring a specific misrepresentation or omission directed at the
market or investors, an unjust enrichment principle covers broader
forms of deceptive conduct, such as misappropriation, that are not
152
necessarily directed at the market or investors. Second, the unjust
enrichment principle is not limited to conduct that directly harms the
market but also covers conduct with a more tenuous connection to a
153
securities transaction. Third, the unjust enrichment principle focuses
primarily on benefits wrongfully extracted by the defendant at the
154
expense of others.

“a right to restitution”); James J. Edelman, Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Wrongs, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1869, 1869 (2001) (“‘[R]estitution’ should be a term that refers only to a particular
remedy, and ‘unjust enrichment’ should be a phrase that describes a particular group of
actionable causes, none of which is a wrong.”); Friedmann, supra note 142, at 510 (“Recognition
of this right [to restitution arising from unjust enrichment] is not dependent upon a showing that
the appropriation was tortious . . . .”); Laycock, supra note 148, at 1284 (“Defendant may be
unjustly enriched without having committed any other civil wrong.”). But see Andrew Kull,
Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1222–23 (1995) (arguing that restitution
should not be viewed as a remedial option, because it can be an independent basis for liability).
150. See, e.g., 1 DOBBS, supra note 149, at 557 (noting that the substantive unjust enrichment
principle “cannot be precisely defined, and for that very reason has potential for resolving new
problems in striking ways”).
151. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). The Restatement is being revised, but the
most recent draft retains this definition of unjust enrichment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (Discussion Draft 2000).
152. This Article uses the words “deceptive” or “deception” to identify a broader form of
misconduct that supports an unjust enrichment claim than the typical misrepresentation or
omission necessary for an antifraud claim. One way of understanding the admittedly thin
distinction between a deception, on the one hand, and a misrepresentation or omission, on the
other, is that a deception often involves a course of conduct as opposed to the use of a particular
statement to effectuate the fraud.
153. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 656 (1997) (“The securities transaction and
the breach of duty thus coincide. This is so even though the person or entity defrauded is not the
other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic information.”).
154. The obvious remedy for insider trading is the disgorgement of gains or payment of a
penalty by the trader. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-704, § 5, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680–81 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2006)); Dooley, supra
note 25, at 14 (“Disgorgement of profits is an increasingly common remedy.”). The remedy
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Broken into three simple elements, the unjust enrichment
principle applies to (1) deceptive conduct (2) coinciding with a
securities transaction (3) that enriches some individual at the expense
of others.
III. UNJUST ENRICHMENT AS AN EXPANSIVE PRINCIPLE
In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court legitimized the unjust
enrichment principle as a substantive basis for liability under Rule
10b-5. This Part describes how, subsequent to O’Hagan, the unjust
enrichment principle has expanded the reach of Rule 10b-5 in the
areas
of
(1)
qualitative
materiality,
(2)
broker-dealer
misappropriation, (3) mutual-fund market timing, and (4) stock
option backdating. Although other academics have examined aspects
of these areas in isolation, this Article is the first to note how they are
tied together by the common thread of unjust enrichment.
A. Qualitative Materiality
As this Section will show, the unjust enrichment principle has
played a substantial role in shaping the requirement that a
misstatement be material for it to trigger liability for securities
155
fraud. In particular, the SEC has increasingly relied upon evidence
of personal enrichment in determining whether financial
misstatements meet the materiality threshold for triggering Rule
10b-5.
As noted earlier, the materiality standard is a key gatekeeper
that works by distinguishing important misstatements that affect
markets and investor decisions from trivial misstatements that do not.
Prior to 1999, misstatements relating to a company’s financial
statements were arguably subject to a quantitative test—to be
156
material, the misstatement had to exceed 5 percent of net income.
reflects the nature of the legal obligation. The insider trading prohibition is concerned with the
unjust enrichment by inside traders rather than direct harm to the market.
155. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (“[I]n order to prevail on a Rule
10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must show that the statements were misleading as to a material fact. It is
not enough that a statement is false or incomplete, if the misrepresented fact is otherwise
insignificant.”).
156. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 128 (2006) available at http://
www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (“For many years, the
rule of thumb was that, in determining the scope of an audit, a potential error exceeding five
percent of annual pre-tax income would be considered material. In evaluating a misstatement,
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Misstatements below that 5 percent threshold were not material and
would not trigger liability for securities fraud.
A quantitative materiality standard is consistent with the view
that Rule 10b-5 primarily serves to encourage efficient markets. The
rationale for a quantitative standard is that misstatements below the 5
percent threshold are unlikely to substantially affect the market’s
assessment of a stock. By limiting liability to quantitatively large
misstatements, the quantitative standard focuses Rule 10b-5 on
misstatements that distort the ability of the market to accurately price
securities.
In 1999, the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (SAB
157
No. 99),
which instructs that the materiality of financial
misstatements should be assessed using a qualitative rather than a
quantitative test. Under a qualitative test, a misstatement below the 5
percent quantitative threshold can be material under certain
158
circumstances. For example, a quantitatively small misstatement can
be material if it leads to financial results that meet earnings targets or
159
criteria for awarding management bonuses. SAB No. 99 has thus
broadened the scope of misstatements that could trigger liability
under Rule 10b-5.
One rationale for SAB No. 99 is consistent with an efficientmarkets reading of Rule 10b-5. Even small misstatements can mask
developments that are significant to the market. A small shortfall in
earnings might signal larger shortfalls to come. On the other hand,
SAB No. 99 can also be seen as motivated by the unjust enrichment

an error that exceeded ten percent of pre-tax income was considered material, while the
materiality of an error between five percent and ten percent of pre-tax income was assessed[]
based on various qualitative factors.”); Matthew J. Barrett, The SEC and Accounting, In Part
Through the Eyes of Pacioli, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 874 (2005) (“As a general rule,
accountants and auditors usually treat any amount which does not exceed five percent of
income before taxes as immaterial.”); Joseph A. Grundfest & Stephen E. Bochner, Fixing 404,
105 MICH. L. REV. 1643, 1662 (2007) (noting the commonality of the 5 percent net-income
standard); Glenn F. Miller, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99: Another Ill-Advised Foray into the
Murky World of Qualitative Materiality, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 361, 363 (2000) (“A numerical rule
of thumb has emerged: misstatements that impact disclosure by less than five percent are not
material.”); Edward A. Weinstein, Materiality: Whose Business Is It?, 77 C.P.A. J. 24, 26 (2007)
(“Although the professional literature never explicitly defined a ‘normal’ materiality limit, many
auditors considered it to be 5% of net income.”).
157. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999).
158. Id. at 45,151.
159. Id. Other qualitative considerations include whether the misstatement concerns a
significant segment of the company’s business, affects regulatory compliance, affects the
company’s ability to comply with loan covenants, or conceals an unlawful transaction. See id.
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principle. Small misstatements may simply prevent fluctuations
caused by the market’s overreaction to minor earnings shortfalls that
should not significantly affect the long-term valuation of the stock.
The motivation for these misstatements might be to allow insiders to
sell stock at favorable prices. By targeting this manipulation, SAB
No. 99 expresses a concern distinct from that of enabling efficient
markets: the concern that certain individuals may be unjustly
enriched through securities transactions.
B. Broker-Dealer Misappropriation
The unjust enrichment principle set forth in O’Hagan has been
the explicit basis for at least one extension of Rule 10b-5 by the
Supreme Court. As this Section discusses, the Court cited O’Hagan in
applying Rule 10b-5 to cover brokers who misappropriate client
funds.
160
In the 2002 case SEC v. Zandford, the Supreme Court upheld a
Rule 10b-5 claim against a broker who stole funds from a
161
discretionary account he managed for a client. Though such theft
does not involve a misrepresentation to the market or an investor
162
concerning a particular security, the Court relied upon concepts of
fiduciary duty in finding Rule 10b-5 liability. Because the broker
163
failed to disclose the theft to the customer, he breached a fiduciary
duty of loyalty to the customer, thus acting deceptively under Rule
164
10b-5. Although the deception did not occur with respect to the
purchase or sale of a particular security, the funds would have been
used to purchase securities, so the Court cited O’Hagan in finding

160. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
161. Id. at 815–16.
162. See, e.g., id. at 820 (“[N]either the SEC nor this Court has ever held that there must be
a misrepresentation about the value of a particular security in order to run afoul of the Act.”).
Rule 10b-5 has long been understood by courts to prohibit certain deceptive acts by brokers
directed at their customers, such as unauthorized trading and churning (excessive trading in an
account). See, e.g., Caiola v. Citibank, 295 F.3d 312, 323–24 (2d Cir. 2002) (listing cases and
situations in which Rule 10b-5 would apply). However, Zandford is the first Supreme Court
decision that can be linked to the unjust enrichment framework set forth by O’Hagan.
163. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 823 (“[A]ny distinction between omissions and
misrepresentations is illusory in the context of a broker who has a fiduciary duty to her
clients.”).
164. Zandford must be reconciled with the Court’s earlier statement in Santa Fe that a
breach of fiduciary duty alone cannot sustain a Rule 10b-5 claim. See supra note 93. The
difference is that there was a deceptive nondisclosure in Zandford, whereas there was no
allegation of a misrepresentation or nondisclosure in Santa Fe.
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that the failure to disclose was “in connection with” the purchase or
sale of a security because the “securities transactions and breaches of
165
fiduciary duty coincide.”
The use of Rule 10b-5 to punish broker-dealer misappropriation
is difficult to reconcile with Rule 10b-5 as an antifraud rule that
promotes efficient markets. Such theft is wrong, but it is not directed
at the market and it does not distort stock market prices. Though
framed in terms of a fraud claim involving a nondisclosure, the core
harm of Zandford is not a failure to disclose. Would the theft have
been justified under Rule 10b-5 if the broker had disclosed to the
customer that he was misappropriating funds? Even if the
nondisclosure enabled the theft, the wrong of the theft is not a lack of
disclosure but the taking of the funds by a fiduciary to enrich himself.
Zandford is best understood as an extension of the unjust
166
enrichment principle introduced by O’Hagan.
Broker-dealer
misappropriation involves deceptive conduct (misappropriation) that
unjustly enriches an individual (the broker) at the expense of another
(the customer). The focus of a broker-dealer misappropriation case is
not on damage caused to the market, but on unjust gains captured by
the broker. Broker-dealer misappropriation is not a fraud directed at
the market but an unjust enrichment much like insider trading.
C. Mutual-Fund Market Timing
The courts have also extended Rule 10b-5 to cover certain types
of mutual-fund market timing, in which an investor such as a hedge
fund enters into an arrangement with a mutual fund allowing the
investor to profit by frequently trading in the mutual fund to take

165. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 824–25; see also Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The
Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1656–57 (2004) (noting
Zandford’s expansive interpretation of Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement).
166. As with the early insider trading cases, Zandford has largely been limited to contexts in
which there is a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 324
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009) (denying the SEC’s motion for a
preliminary injunction due to the lack of a fiduciary duty); In re Refco Capital Mkts., Ltd., 586
F. Supp. 2d 172, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[N]one of the complaints adequately alleges that RCM
engaged in deceptive conduct through affirmative acts or misrepresentations, breach of a
fiduciary duty, or any other manner.”).
There is a question whether the Zandford test might be applied to nonfiduciary agency
relationships as the Supreme Court did with respect to insider trading in O’Hagan, further
expanding the reach of the unjust enrichment principle.
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167

advantage of pricing inefficiencies. Market timing often harms other
investors in the mutual fund because it generates transaction costs
168
that those investors must bear. Both mutual funds that improperly
allow market timing and investors who attempt to profit through
market timing have been targeted under Rule 10b-5, with varying
degrees of success. This Section describes how both types of markettiming cases implicate the unjust enrichment principle.
At least superficially, mutual funds that allow market timing
might be subject to liability under the antifraud interpretation of Rule
10b-5. Because of its costs, many mutual funds have policies against
market timing and represent to investors that they prohibit market
169
timing. Funds that publicly proclaim that they prohibit market
timing while secretly allowing it are making a material misstatement
to their investors. And indeed, many market-timing cases have
included standard fraud claims under Rule 10b-5.
In another sense, it is difficult to cabin the harm of allowing
market timing solely within the scope of the antifraud rule. The
theory that the mutual funds lied about market timing does not
capture the full extent of the wrong. If a mutual fund were silent
concerning whether it allowed market timing, there would be no
170
fraud cause of action, but there would still be a case that the
investor had been wronged under an unjust enrichment theory.
Mutual fund managers owe fiduciary duties to mutual fund
171
investors. The wrong of market timing is that the mutual fund
167. See, e.g., SEC v. Gann, 565 F.3d 932, 934–35 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Market timers typically
buy and sell shares of a mutual fund quickly to take advantage of minute, short-term
differentials between a fund’s value and the value of the securities it holds.”).
168. See, e.g., SEC v. Pimco Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 458 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (“[Market timing] can also harm investors . . . by increasing trading and brokerage costs,
as well as tax liabilities, incurred by a fund and spread across all fund investors.”); Stephen Choi
& Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1021, 1041
(2007) (citing studies indicating that market timing reduces the returns of nontiming investors).
169. See, e.g., Pimco Advisors, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 459 (“The potential for market timing to
harm the interests of mutual fund investors has led many mutual funds . . . to adopt policies
intended to limit market timing within their funds.”).
170. Indeed, at least one court has dismissed a market-timing case because the funds did not
represent to investors that they prohibited market timing and thus the complaint did not
sufficiently allege fraud. SEC v. Tambone, 417 F. Supp. 2d 127, 134 (D. Mass. 2006) (“[T]he
SEC has not alleged that the defendants made any untrue or misleading statement of material
fact.”).
171. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2006); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963) (“The Investment Advisers Act of
1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment
advisory relationship,’ as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all
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managers deceptively profit at the expense of investors to whom they
owe a fiduciary duty. In exchange for the right to time markets,
market timers promise mutual fund managers to invest additional
172
assets, increasing the fees earned by the mutual fund managers.
And indeed, at least one court has recognized that deceptive market
173
timing can violate Rule 10b-5 under a fiduciary-duty theory.
Allowing market timing is wrong not just because it violates truthfuldisclosure obligations, but also because it is a deceptive scheme that
enriches a mutual fund’s managers at the expense of its investors.
Similarly, parties that have engaged in market timing without the
consent of mutual funds that have policies against market timing have
also been held liable under Rule 10b-5. Courts have permitted Rule
10b-5 actions against parties who tried to circumvent mutual fund
limitations on market timing, often by submitting orders through
174
multiple accounts. The difficulty with fitting such cases under an
antifraud theory of Rule 10b-5 is that such conduct does not involve a
misrepresentation or omission directed at investors or the market.
The market timer is enriched through a deceptive course of conduct
relating to its dealings with the mutual fund, which invests on the
market timer’s behalf. Such deception may not fit within the category
of fraud but is captured by the unjust enrichment principle set forth in
O’Hagan.
conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—
to render advice which was not disinterested.” (footnote omitted)); accord EBC I, Inc. v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 31–32 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing a common-law fiduciary
duty).
172. See, e.g., SEC v. Treadway, 430 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing a
scheme in which a mutual fund gave a hedge fund “market timing privileges in certain PIMCO
funds in exchange for long-term or ‘sticky asset’ investments in other PIMCO funds”).
173. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 856 (D. Md. 2005) (“Although
market timing itself may be lawful, it nevertheless is prohibited by Rule 10b-5 if it is engaged in
by favored market insiders at the expense of long-term mutual fund investors from whom it is
concealed and who have a right to rely upon its prevention by fund advisers’ and managers’
good faith performance of their fiduciary obligations.”); see also Potter v. Janus Inv. Fund, 483
F. Supp. 2d 692, 702 (D. Ill. 2007) (citing favorably the above-quoted language from Matter of
Mutual Funds Investment Litigation, 384 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Md. 2005)). Another court was
more skeptical that market-timing arrangements by themselves could support a claim under
Rule 10b-5, though it noted that a breach of fiduciary duty might also support a claim under
Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2006). Pimco
Advisors, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 469–72.
174. See, e.g., SEC v. Gann, 565 F.3d 932, 936 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The material misstatements
at issue are [defendant’s] use of . . . varying client account numbers to disguise the frequency
and magnitude of [the defendant’s] trading in the various funds.”); SEC v. O’Meally, No. 06 Civ.
6483, 2008 WL 4090461, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2008) (describing a Rule 10b-5 claim against
brokers who concealed their identities in connection with market-timing transactions).
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D. Stock Option Backdating
A final setting in which the unjust enrichment principle has been
relevant is the stock option backdating scandal. Again, although stock
option backdating has been described as fraud, an equally compelling
explanation for the wrongness of the practice is unjust enrichment.
Many companies compensate executives and other workers in
part through stock options. A stock option gives an individual the
right to buy a stock at a certain price, called the strike price, which is
usually equal to the price of the stock on the day the stock option is
175
awarded. In theory, stock options give workers and executives an
incentive to increase the value of the firm so that they can exercise
their stock options and profit from the differential between the strike
176
price and the increased market price.
To make it more likely that recipients would exercise their stock
options at a profit, some companies would retroactively change the
award date of stock options to an earlier date when the stock price
177
was lower. As a result, the strike price would be lower than if it had
been recorded on the day the option was actually granted, increasing
the probability that the stock option would be profitable when
178
exercised. When academic studies uncovered this conduct, the
revelation resulted in a significant number of criminal and civil
179
enforcement actions.
Until 2005, stock option backdating could be used to improperly
180
manipulate the company’s financial statements. Prior to that time,

175. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 13, SEC v. Nicholas, SACV08-539 CJC (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2008);
PATRICK CONROY, ERIK STETTLER, NATHAN SAPERIA, SUNIL PANIKKATH & MATTHEW
EVANS, OPTIONS BACKDATING: A PRIMER 1–3 (2006), available at http://www.nera.com/
extImage/PUB_Backdating_Part_1_Primer_SEC1381_Jul2007-FINAL.pdf.
176. See, e.g., M.P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic Impact
of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1605 (2007) (“The inclusion
of stock options in executive compensation packages is generally meant to align management’s
interests with the interests of the company’s shareholders. This is accomplished by making the
executive’s compensation dependent on stock performance.” (footnote omitted)).
177. See, e.g., Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802,
805 n.4 (2005) (finding abnormally positive returns after option grants); Charles Forelle &
James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18–19, 2006, at A1.
178. Of course, there is no guarantee that even a backdated stock option will be profitable.
See, e.g., David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the
Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 581–88 (2007).
179. Id. at 574–75.
180. In addition, there are tax implications. See, e.g., Narayanan et al., supra note 176, at
1621–22 (listing “three potential effects on taxation”).
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companies did not have to account for the cost of stock options as an
expense unless they were “in the money”—that is, the strike price was
lower than the market price on the date that the stock option was
181
awarded. Backdating allowed a company to give stock options for
which the market price on the date of issue exceeded the strike price,
while representing that the options were not “in the money” and not
recognizing an expense.
Although stock option backdating might inflate the earnings of a
company and be considered a fraud, it is unclear whether the practice
182
fits within the antifraud conception of Rule 10b-5. Backdating
arguably involves a misrepresentation; however, backdating by itself
may not materially affect the market value of the backdating
183
corporation. Though backdating affects the way in which the option
grant is classified, potentially increasing earnings, in some cases the
number of options awarded would not be large enough to
significantly distort the market’s assessment of the company’s future
184
earnings. And it is unlikely that stock option backdating was
motivated by a desire to inflate earnings by masking the cost of
compensation. Companies had wide leeway to give options that were
185
not “in the money” without any earnings impact at all.
In backdating cases without a material impact on earnings, one
might argue that backdating is important to investors because it says
something about the character of management. If that is the case, the
antifraud theory at least partly motivates the prohibition against
181. See, e.g., id. at 1622 (“If options were granted in-the-money, the difference between the
grant date stock price and the exercise price (called the intrinsic value of the option) had to be
treated as an expense and deducted from income.”). Since December 2005, companies must
expense the fair market value of any stock options. Id. at 1623.
182. Many stock option backdating complaints allege violations of Rule 10b-5. See, e.g.,
Belova v. Sharp, No. CV 07-299-MO, 2008 WL 700961, at *7 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2008) (denying a
motion to dismiss a Rule 10b-5 claim in a backdating case); In re Zoran Corp. Derivative Litig.,
511 F. Supp. 2d 986, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (same).
183. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Options Fines: A Hard Call, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2007, at C1
(“[H]ow important was the backdating to Brocade if the stock recovered?”).
184. See, e.g., Narayanan et al., supra note 176, at 1611 (“A counterargument to the
materiality claim may be made in cases where the backdating or forward-dating produced de
minimis income for the executives, and thus had a minor effect on the financial statements.”).
Of course, there will be cases in which the extent of backdating will have a significant impact on
earnings. See, e.g., In re Take-Two Interactive Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 247, 291–92 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (finding that backdating was material when it led to overstatement of income by 20
percent in 2002, 11 percent in 2003, and 5–6 percent in 2004 and 2006).
185. Walker, supra note 178, at 566 (“Under the accounting rules in place at the time,
companies could have issued at-the-money options on unlimited numbers of shares without
reporting any compensation expense in their earnings statements.”).
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186

deceptive backdating. But it is equally likely that unjust enrichment
rather than fraud is the primary reason such conduct is prohibited and
187
punished. By increasing the probability that they could exercise a
stock option at a price below the prevailing market price, executives
granted themselves greater amounts of compensation than
188
disclosed. As a result, stock option backdating may have led to the
enrichment of executives who manipulated the system, violating the
189
executives’ duty of loyalty.
Thus, although courts may require plaintiffs to fit backdating
claims within an antifraud framework, the reason the backdating
scandal spurred outrage was not the practice’s impact on earnings
statements. The primary wrong of backdating is the gains by those
who received backdated stock options rather than direct harm to
shareholders.
IV. THE CONVERGENCE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND FRAUD
Though the unjust enrichment strand of Rule 10b-5 doctrine
described in Parts II and III is distinct from the rule’s antifraud roots,
the unjust enrichment and antifraud principles have curiously
186. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 109, at 644–45 (“The recent options-backdating
scandals have been a particularly compelling opportunity to make unjust enrichment
arguments.”).
Judge Cote of the Southern District of New York has described a Rule 10b-5 stock
option backdating case in unjust enrichment terms:
These defendants received options, the exercise or strike prices of which did not
match the actual date on which defendants received them. The options, most of which
were allegedly backdated two days, garnered the defendants immediate returns of up
to twenty percent of the exercise price. Such benefits are “concrete and personal”
because they represent a species of compensation different from the one ordinarily
accumulated by corporate officers and directors: In distinction to standard stock
options, the returns on the backdated options are immediate and risk-free.
In re Openwave Sys. Sec. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 236, 249–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
187. It is worth noting that many backdating complaints not only allege Rule 10b-5 claims
but also state law unjust enrichment claims. See, e.g., In re Atmel Corp. Derivative Litig., No. C
06-4592, 2008 WL 2561957, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2008); In re Verisign, Inc., Derivative
Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1217–18 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
188. As David Walker explains, although stock option backdating may not have had a
significant earnings effect, the practice made it appear that executives were receiving less
compensation through stock options than they really were. By making it appear that executives
were receiving options at a time when the stock price was low, stock option backdating may
have made it appear that executives received stock options that were worth less than the options
that were actually granted. As a result, executives might have been able to negotiate higher pay
packages than they would have received without backdating. See Walker, supra note 178, at
588–91.
189. See, e.g., Narayanan et al., supra note 176, at 1617.
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converged. This Part shows how the unjust enrichment principle has
been used to subtly shape how Rule 10b-5 targets fraud in the context
of the pleading requirements in a securities fraud class action. In
many cases, it is becoming more difficult for plaintiffs to avoid
dismissal without alleging that some manager was unjustly enriched
through the fraud. To the extent that there are doubts about the
validity of an unjust enrichment principle, the fact that the principle is
invoked by those who seek to narrow the reach of Rule 10b-5 shows
consensus on its relevance.
A. The Scienter Requirement
The use of the unjust enrichment principle as a limit originates
from the requirement that, to state a claim on a Rule 10b-5 securities
fraud action, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with
190
scienter. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court
sensibly read the text of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
191
as not extending liability to negligent acts. The Court held that to
establish securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, a defendant must have
192
acted with some degree of deceptive intent—that is, with scienter.
The need for a scienter requirement is apparent. Imposing
liability for accidental misstatements would not make sense from a
policy perspective. Companies make thousands of statements in any
given year; some will contain mistakes. To impose liability for all such
mistakes would impose substantial costs on companies that would
prove unmanageable. Scienter distinguishes actionable from
nonactionable misstatements in a way consistent with the commonlaw definition of fraud. In doing so, scienter can serve as a screen that
courts can use to dismiss meritless suits.
Despite its usefulness as a limit, the scienter requirement can
create a divergence between Rule 10b-5 and its goal of reducing
misstatements that distort the efficiency of the markets. Rather than
focusing on the nature of the misstatement and its effect on the
market, the scienter requirement shifts the focus to the motivation of
individual managers who might have been involved with the
misstatement. A scienter requirement may shift Rule 10b-5 away

190. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
191. Id. at 214.
192. Id. at 193.
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from primarily regulating entities and their interaction with the
193
market and toward regulating individual enrichment.
B. The “Concrete Benefits” Test
As the need for limiting the costs of Rule 10b-5 actions has
increased, the courts and Congress have fashioned more and more
elaborate tests for determining whether a defendant acted with
scienter. As this Section shows, these tests have shaped the substance
of the scienter requirement so that it increasingly resembles an unjust
enrichment test.
Given the costs of discovery and the frequency of securities fraud
class actions, courts have developed heightened pleading standards
194
on the issue of scienter. Even in the absence of legislation, some
courts required plaintiffs bringing cases under Rule 10b-5 to allege
195
specific facts in the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. The
basis for requiring heightened pleading was Rule 9(b) of the Federal
196
which requires plaintiffs to allege
Rules of Civil Procedure,
common-law fraud claims with particularity. The Second Circuit took
the lead in imposing such a specificity requirement with respect to
193. Some federal circuit courts have further focused Rule 10b-5 on the conduct of
individuals as opposed to entities by rejecting the possibility of “collective scienter,” requiring
that scienter be established for some particular individual, rather than for the corporation itself.
See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190,
195 (2d Cir. 2008) (“To prove liability against a corporation, of course, a plaintiff must prove
that an agent of the corporation committed a culpable act with the requisite scienter, and that
the act (and accompanying mental state) are attributable to the corporation.”); Southland Sec.
Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting “collective
scienter” theory); Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“[T]here is no case law supporting an independent ‘collective scienter’ theory.”). Such an
exclusive focus on individual scienter may not be merited because fraud often originates from
dysfunctional groups. See generally James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company
Management: Lessons from Bank Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 859, 904–07 (2006) (arguing that
fraud in public companies tends to be the result of dysfunctional group mentalities).
194. Of course, the procedural standard for pleading scienter is not identical to the
substantive standard for scienter. However, very few securities fraud class actions proceed past
discovery. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 525 (1991) (citing studies finding that few
securities class actions go to trial). Thus, the procedural rather than the substantive standard is
in most cases determinative of whether a securities fraud class action will succeed.
195. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the
Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U.
L.Q. 537, 544–51 (1998) (describing different heightened pleading standards prior to passage of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.)).
196. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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197

scienter, reading Rule 9(b) to require that the plaintiff allege a
198
“strong inference of fraudulent intent.” The plaintiff can establish
this strong inference “(a) by alleging facts to show that defendants
had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging
facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
199
misbehavior or recklessness.”
Of the two alternatives, recklessness is seen as more difficult to
establish. To establish conscious recklessness under the Second
Circuit standard, there must be a specific allegation that the
defendants “knew facts or had access to information suggesting that
their public statements were not accurate” or “failed to check
200
information they had a duty to monitor.” Precise evidence that a
defendant knew that information was false can be difficult to establish
without internal information that cannot be obtained without
201
discovery.
Motive and opportunity are somewhat easier to allege. Certainly,
managers who control the corporation will have the opportunity to
commit fraud. The main question is whether they have the motive to
do so. On the surface, managers have many motives for causing
misrepresentations, some of which can be characterized as personal.
Managers may want to meet performance targets that result in
bonuses, they may want to increase the stock price so that they can
profitably exercise stock options, or they may just want to hang onto
their jobs. But many managers who commit fraud may do so not for
selfish personal reasons but because they believe that doing so serves
the interests of the shareholders. For example, a manager might hide
bad news because he thinks it will cause panic that will cause a sharp
decline in the company’s stock price to a level below what
management believes is the stock’s intrinsic value.
The Second Circuit, however, narrowly defined “motive” to
encompass only personal, or “concrete,” benefits. It stated that
motive “entail[s] concrete benefits that could be realized by one or

197. Sale, supra note 195, at 549–51.
198. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Goldman
v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that “the Complaint alleged a
sufficient factual basis to support its allegations of scienter”).
199. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128.
200. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000).
201. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 195, at 573–74, 578–79 (noting that the heightened pleading
standard effectively requires that the complaint allege internal information to survive a motion
to dismiss).
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202

more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged.”
It specifically rejected the notion that general motives—such as
making the company appear to be performing better, or even abstract
203
economic self-interest—could be a concrete benefit. Under the
Second Circuit’s scienter test, unless there is a specific allegation that
a manager will personally benefit from a fraud, the motive element
will not be satisfied.
The Second Circuit’s motive-and-opportunity standard and
“concrete benefits” test have become even more influential with the
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
204
(PSLRA), which adopted a heightened pleading standard with
respect to scienter to reduce the incidence of abusive securities fraud
205
litigation. The PSLRA requires that the plaintiff plead facts
206
establishing a “strong inference” of fraudulent intent.
207
The phrase “strong inference” is deliberately ambiguous, and
circuit courts have split in deciding how to interpret it. One obvious
possibility is that the PSLRA simply adopted the Second Circuit test
208
for pleading scienter. And, indeed, after the PSLRA, the Second

202. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130; see also Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 170 (2d Cir.
2000) (citing Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994), after Congress
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.)).
203. See, e.g., Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Insufficient motives, we
have held, can include (1) the desire for the corporation to appear profitable and (2) the desire
to keep stock prices high to increase officer compensation.”); Ganino, 228 F.3d at 170 (“General
allegations that the defendants acted in their economic self-interest are not enough.”); Chill v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that creating the appearance of
investment profit is insufficient); Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130 (holding that allegations that
“executives aim to prolong the benefits of the positions they hold” are insufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss).
204. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scatted sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
205. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2006).
206. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2). The Supreme Court recently specified that “[t]o qualify as ‘strong’ . . .
an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent
and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.” Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).
207. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders:
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 650–66
(2002) (concluding that the ambiguity of the “strong inference” standard was deliberate and
facilitated passage of the PSLRA).
208. There is evidence in the legislative history that Congress modeled the PSLRA after the
Second Circuit standard. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15 (1995) (stating that “the Committee
chose a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading standard of the Second Circuit”). But see
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“Because the Conference Committee intends
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Circuit simply retained its motive-and-opportunity standard,
209
including the “concrete benefits” test. A number of circuits have
since adopted the Second Circuit’s motive-and-opportunity
210
standard, and some circuits have explicitly adopted the Second
211
Circuit’s “concrete benefits” test.
Some circuits have limited the test for scienter even more,
finding that motive and opportunity alone do not establish scienter
and requiring that a plaintiff plead intentional or reckless conduct at
212
the motion to dismiss stage. Many circuits do rely upon the Second
Circuit test, however, to the extent that they accept motive as a factor
213
for determining whether recklessness has been alleged. Some of the
to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit’s
case law interpreting this pleading standard.”).
209. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Rothman v. Gregor, 220
F.3d 81, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The key question is motive, namely whether the Appellants
adequately alleged ‘concrete benefits that could be realized by one or more of the false
statements and wrongful disclosures alleged.’” (quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25
F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994))).
210. See, e.g., Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659–60 (8th
Cir. 2001) (using the Second Circuit’s motive-and-opportunity standard to frame its analysis); In
re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534–35 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs can
plead scienter by proving motive and opportunity).
211. See Fla. State Bd. of Admin., 270 F.3d at 659 (noting that the Second Circuit test
restricts the types of motive that give rise to liability); Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609,
621 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing the Second Circuit in applying the “concrete benefits” test); see also
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 290 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that unusual levels of insider trading
could support scienter but not explicitly adopting the “concrete benefits” test).
212. The Ninth Circuit imposed the strictest standard, requiring that the plaintiff plead
“deliberate recklessness.” See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.
1999) (“In order to show a strong inference of deliberate recklessness, plaintiffs must state facts
that come closer to demonstrating intent, as opposed to mere motive and opportunity.”); see
also Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, In re Silicon Graphics Inc.:
Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 774 (2000) (“The Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation in Silicon Graphics is the most stringent, requiring plaintiffs to allege facts that
would show the defendants were ‘deliberately reckless’ in making the misrepresentation that
gave rise to the fraud claim.”). Other circuits have rejected the motive-and-opportunity
standard but have not required “deliberate” recklessness. See, e.g., Ottmann v. Hanger
Orthopedic Grp., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400,
410–11 (5th Cir. 2001); City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261–62 (10th Cir.
2001); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado Brands,
Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551
(6th Cir. 1999).
213. See, e.g., Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 345; Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 410–11; City of Philadelphia,
264 F.3d at 1261–62; Greebel, 194 F.3d at 197; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285–86; In re Comshare, 183
F.3d at 551. The Ninth Circuit has also considered motive as evidence of scienter. See Howard v.
Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that motive and opportunity can be
“considered as circumstantial evidence of [scienter]”).

PARK IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2010]

10/17/2010 10:36:59 PM

THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT PRINCIPLE

391

circuits relying on a recklessness test consider motive in terms of
214
concrete benefits. For example, the Ninth Circuit has stated that
allegations of insider trading are relevant in supporting allegations of
215
recklessness. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that although
motive is not a prerequisite to liability, “personal financial gain may
216
weigh heavily in favor of a scienter inference.”
The Second Circuit’s “concrete benefits” standard is a variant of
the unjust enrichment principle. The standard shifts attention from
whether the fraud has harmed plaintiff shareholders to whether the
defendants have enriched themselves through the fraud. By
distinguishing fraud motivated by unjust enrichment from fraud
motivated by a desire to fool the market to keep the stock price high,
the “concrete benefits” standard draws a somewhat arbitrary line.
Although, in theory, a “concrete benefits” standard need not
significantly shift the focus of Rule 10b-5 to unjust enrichment, in
practice it has. Because of the need to move beyond a motion to
dismiss, there is a natural tendency for plaintiffs’ attorneys to allege
facts, such as trading on inside information, to meet the motive-andopportunity test. Indeed, Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale find that
after the enactment of the PSLRA, there has been an increase in the
217
number of allegations relating to insider trading. In influencing the
nature of the cases brought under Rule 10b-5, the “concrete benefits”
test affects the type of issues that judges decide, shaping the doctrine
defining Rule 10b-5.

One study finds that sufficient allegation of motive is virtually a prerequisite to
surviving a motion to dismiss. Ann Morales Olazabal & Patricia Sanchez Abril, The Ubiquity of
Greed: A Contextual Model for Analysis of Scienter, 60 FLA. L. REV. 401, 404 (2008) (“[O]f the
approximately one hundred reported circuit court decisions that have addressed scienter since
the passage of the PSLRA, not a single case in which there was no apparent motive—or the
motive alleged was practically or economically nonsensical—survived the dismissal stage.”).
214. See, e.g., Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 420 (finding that “allegations that corporate officers
and directors would benefit from enhancing the value of their stock and/or stock options and
that the corporation would benefit by receiving more for its shares to be issued in the July 1997
public offering are likewise insufficient to support a strong inference of scienter”); City of
Philadelphia, 264 F.3d at 1261–62 (citing the “concrete benefits” test in explaining that motive
could be sufficient to support finding of recklessness in certain circumstances).
215. See Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 434–35 (9th Cir. 2001).
216. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 325 (2007).
217. Thompson & Sale, supra note 18, at 901 (“The use of insider trades as a hook for fraud
was increasing before the 1995 Act, but its use has grown since that time, in part to meet the
increasingly restrictive pleading standard imposed by Congress and welcomed by the courts.”).
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The “concrete benefits” test may also serve as a heuristic that
218
judges use to screen cases. Indeed, it has spawned a number of sub219
heuristics concerning what qualifies as a sufficient concrete benefit.
Nonexpert judges may interpret the existence of a concrete benefit as
a prerequisite in pleading scienter, rather than simply one way of
220
establishing scienter. As a result, some suits involving substantial
misrepresentations that distort the market might be dismissed at the
motion to dismiss stage without further inquiry if there is no evidence
221
of concrete benefits.
Though narrowing the test for scienter makes the standard
simpler to apply, the preoccupation with “concrete benefits” has the
danger of creating a substantial disconnect between the efficientmarkets view of Rule 10b-5—that its purpose is to deter
misstatements that hurt the ability of the market to value stocks—and
its actual implementation, which tends to target cases in which
individuals are unjustly enriched. Of course, to some extent, there is
overlap. When managers manipulate stock prices so they can enrich
themselves, the market’s ability to function is often hindered. But
there are many cases in which there are substantial
misrepresentations that are not motivated by personal benefit. With a
“concrete benefits” test, such misrepresentations might not be
scrutinized.

218. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The
Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51
EMORY L.J. 83, 85 (2002) (noting that judges use heuristics to dismiss cases); Hillary A. Sale,
Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 923–24 (2002) (noting that courts use the
“concrete benefits” test as a heuristic to dismiss cases).
219. See, e.g., Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) (requiring
“unusual insider trading activity” to satisfy the “concrete benefits” test and holding that stock
sales of less than 11 percent were not sufficiently unusual); see also Rothman v. Gregor, 220
F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2000) (listing instances in which insider trading has been found to be
“unusual”); Sale, supra note 218, at 923–44 (describing various insider trading heuristics). But
see In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[N]one of these cases
established a per se rule that the sale by one officer of corporate stock for a relatively small sum
can never amount to unusual trading.”).
220. Generally, heuristics allow nonexpert judges to easily decide complex legal issues. See
Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 218, at 84–85.
221. See generally, Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598 (2007) (finding that securities fraud class
actions without “hard evidence” of fraud are more likely to be dismissed after passage of the
PSLRA).
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C. Renewed Focus on Individual Liability
In addition to the narrowing of Rule 10b-5’s scope by the courts
through the “concrete benefits” test, a number of academic proposals
would move Rule 10b-5 even closer toward the unjust enrichment
principle. For example, a number of prominent commentators have
proposed limiting Rule 10b-5’s scope by eliminating vicarious liability
222
for securities fraud. For various reasons, it may be preferable to
recover damages for securities fraud from individual managers rather
than from the corporation. As agents of the corporation, individual
managers are the ones who make misrepresentations to the market
223
and may benefit personally from such fraud. Because unjust
enrichment provides the primary incentive for fraud, it might be
better to target the individual managers, not the corporations for
which they work.
A few commentators have gone even further and argued that
securities fraud class actions under Rule 10b-5 should be limited to
cases against individuals who are unjustly enriched by
224
misrepresentations to the market.
These commentators are
skeptical of the utility of requiring the corporation to compensate its
shareholders for securities fraud. Compensating injured shareholders
with corporate funds arguably requires the shareholders to pay for
part of their own compensation because it comes from the
225
corporation that they own. In contrast, a payment from enriched

222. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 734; Coffee, Reforming,
supra note 55, at 1582.
223. See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 222, at 694 (“We predict that Fraud on the
Market generally will be committed by officers and directors seeking to conceal from the
market, and from the firm’s shareholders, that the firm is ailing in an attempt to save their jobs
and their investments in the firm.”); Coffee, Reforming, supra note 55, at 1572 (“The persons
most responsible for the accounting irregularities at Enron, Worldcom, and a host of other
companies were managers who, beginning in the 1990s, began to be primarily compensated with
equity compensation and so had a strong incentive to recognize income prematurely in order to
inflate reported income.”).
224. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know
It, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 3 (2007) (“A [securities fraud class action] should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears that insiders have enjoyed gains from trading during the
fraud period.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 106, at 644 (arguing that restitution is an
efficient measure of damages in Rule 10b-5 cases); Adam C. Pritchard, ‘Basic’ Error Is Focus on
Loss, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 22, 2008, at 26 (proposing that damages in Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-themarket actions be measured by defendants’ gain).
225. In an earlier article, I critique this “circularity problem.” See James J. Park, Shareholder
Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323 (2009).
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individuals does not suffer from circularity when it comes from
personal rather than corporate funds. Given this circularity problem
and the costs of securities fraud class actions, some critics contend it is
more efficient to limit damages in securities fraud class actions to the
226
amount by which such individuals are unjustly enriched.
If
implemented, such a limit would complete the transformation of Rule
10b-5 from an antifraud rule to an unjust enrichment rule.
The proposals to limit Rule 10b-5’s reach to individuals who
commit insider trading are a natural extension of the tendency of
courts to require a showing of concrete benefits before a securities
fraud class action may proceed. Oddly, these efforts to narrow the
reach of Rule 10b-5 share a commonality with efforts to expand the
reach of Rule 10b-5 in that they both rely upon the unjust enrichment
principle. At the same time, the narrowing of Rule 10b-5 through use
of the unjust enrichment principle may create tensions with the
traditional efficient-markets rationale for Rule 10b-5. Part V
describes the clash between unjust enrichment and efficient markets
and how the two theories might be reconciled.
V. RECONCILING EFFICIENT MARKETS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Ironically, the once-controversial use of Rule 10b-5 to prohibit
insider trading is now rarely questioned, whereas the conventional
use of Rule 10b-5 to deter deceptive misstatements that distort stock
market prices is more and more limited to cases involving insider
enrichment. Despite this Article’s support for the unjust enrichment
principle, this is a troubling development in that encouraging efficient
markets should still be considered the primary purpose of Rule 10b-5.
This Part seeks to reconcile the unjust enrichment principle with
the traditional efficient-markets conception by describing Rule 10b-5
as having first-order and second-order concerns. The first-order
concern reflects the traditional economic goal of encouraging efficient
markets. The second-order concern reflects a worry about unjust
enrichment that offends public values. Although the efficient-markets
concern is the primary purpose of Rule 10b-5, the unjust enrichment
principle also plays a significant role in creating limits on the ways in
which individuals can unfairly exploit markets.

226. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 106, at 634.
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A. Efficient Markets
Despite the increasing legitimacy of the unjust enrichment
principle, this Section contends that courts and policymakers should
be wary of thinking of Rule 10b-5 as mainly targeting unjust
enrichment. The first-order concern of Rule 10b-5 is to encourage
companies to disclose accurate information, enabling markets to
227
function efficiently. Rule 10b-5 should not be reduced to a
prohibition of insider trading. This Section discusses a number of
areas in which the efficient-markets and unjust-enrichment
conceptions are in tension and suggests ways to ensure that the rule’s
first-order concern is not eclipsed.
The shift to a Rule 10b-5 targeted primarily at insider enrichment
is consistent with Paul Mahoney’s novel interpretation of the purpose
of securities regulation. In a 1995 article, Mahoney argues that
mandatory disclosure does more than promote efficient markets: it
228
also checks agency costs. Disclosure by public companies allows
investors to monitor self-dealing and shirking by management. Going
beyond this descriptive point, Mahoney contends that mandatory
disclosure should be limited to information necessary to monitor self229
dealing by management. For Mahoney, the cost of disclosure meant
to encourage accurate pricing of securities was too high, and thus it
might be more efficient if securities regulation focused on the
230
problem of agency costs.
Though securities regulation does not limit mandatory disclosure
to information necessary to monitor management, securities fraud
enforcement is more and more directed at frauds that reflect agency
costs. As shown earlier, courts increasingly rely on the heuristic of
insider trading in determining whether the scienter requirement has
been met, and there have been proposals to limit private enforcement
231
of Rule 10b-5 to cases involving insider trading.

227. As previously outlined in Part I, the importance of deterring fraud that harms markets
is perhaps self-evident. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 713 (1996) (“[T]here is one thing
[securities scholars] do agree on: fraud is very, very bad for securities markets.”).
228. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1048.
229. Id. at 1089–1104.
230. See id. at 1049; see also Mahoney, supra note 51, at 635 (“Private enforcement of Rule
10b-5 . . . adds nothing to the arsenal of devices (principally the market for corporate control)
used to reduce agency losses.”).
231. See supra Parts IV.B–C.
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Although it may be the case that focusing on fraud motivated by
unjust enrichment would be sufficient to deter securities fraud, there
is also a danger that limiting fraud liability to cases involving
232
individual enrichment would significantly underdeter. Managers
who mislead the market are not always motivated to do so by
personal enrichment. Limiting securities fraud class actions to cases
involving unjust enrichment would mean that companies would have
incentives to deceive the market in a way that cannot be linked back
to individual enrichment. Moreover, the magnitude of investor losses
caused by a securities fraud is typically much greater than the amount
by which individuals may enrich themselves through such fraud.
Securities fraud class actions will have no chance of significantly
compensating those harmed by fraud if damages are limited to
refunding those unjust enrichment gains.
Certainly, the influence of the unjust enrichment principle on
securities fraud class actions evidences a concern with administrative
costs that must be balanced against the benefits of a strong fraud
prohibition. The courts obviously focus on the narrow concept of
“concrete benefits” because it provides a higher hurdle for plaintiffs
than a broader conception of fraud. Scholars argue for limiting
liability to individuals for a similar reason: the substantial costs
associated with securities fraud class actions. A restrictive standard
for pleading scienter is a convenient way for judges to screen out
strike suits that are brought to extort a settlement.
The convenience of narrowing the scienter standard comes at a
cost: a growing disconnect between the screening standard and the
role of securities fraud class actions as a facilitator of efficient
markets. Perhaps the greatest danger of the rise of the unjust
enrichment principle is its tendency to shift focus from the first-order
concern of efficient markets to what is essentially a second-order
concern. The lack of support for the fraud-on-the-market cause of
action may partly reflect a growing ambiguity about what securities
fraud class actions are supposed to do. To the extent that securities
fraud class actions turn on whether there is proof of individual
232. Of course, the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA do not apply to actions
brought by the SEC. That is not to say that the SEC does not consider unjust enrichment in
enforcing Rule 10b-5. Enrichment is a factor in determining whether the SEC will seek
penalties. Press Release, SEC, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm
(“If the corporation is in any other way unjustly enriched, this similarly weighs in support of the
imposition of a corporate penalty.”).
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enrichment, results will seem arbitrary. Suppose Company A commits
the same accounting misstatement as Company B. Managers of both
companies are motivated by a desire to increase the stock price, but
only Company B is liable because an executive happened to sell a
significant amount of stock. If the primary concern is to promote
efficient markets, the relevant consideration should be the intent to
233
fool the market rather than personal enrichment.
Courts might better strike a balance between screening meritless
cases and maintaining a regime in which Rule 10b-5 consistently
encourages efficient markets by not defining scienter exclusively in
terms of “concrete benefits.” Fraud that is motivated by a general
desire to make the corporation appear to be doing better than it is
can be just as harmful to the functioning of a market as fraud that is
motivated by a desire to personally benefit through stock sales.
Managers are not solely motivated by the desire to line their pockets
but may instead commit fraud because they think it will benefit
234
shareholders. Although there is a need to limit the reach of
securities fraud class actions, judges should be careful not to use the
“concrete benefits” test as an arbitrary heuristic that overly narrows
the scope of scienter. Focusing on a heuristic may result in securities
fraud class actions drifting further and further from their initial
purpose, which is to deter and compensate for material
misrepresentations that distort efficient markets.
Because the proposals discussed in Part IV.C would essentially
make Rule 10b-5 an unjust enrichment rule, courts should not limit
233. The regime set forth by Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 is a more consistent
effort to promote efficient markets. See Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) § 11, 15
U.S.C. § 77k (2006). The primary factor determining liability under Section 11 is whether the
misstatement is material or not. Id. Individual directors and officers can evade liability by
establishing that they acted with due diligence. Id. Of course, the context of Section 11, in which
the corporation is acting as a seller of securities, differs from Rule 10b-5 cases, in which the
fraud does not relate to the purchase or sale of securities by the corporation. But the Section 11
action is an example of a regime in which liability for securities fraud does not hinge on unjust
enrichment.
234. See, e.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008)
(describing a securities fraud in which management “conceal[ed] bad news in the hope that it
[would] be overtaken by good news”); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate
Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others
and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 296 (2004) (“[F]inancial misreporting is
complicated in motivation. It can be self-serving, potentially profitable for the business, or—
frequently—both at the same time.”); James C. Spindler, Vicarious Liability for Bad Corporate
Governance: Are We Wrong About 10b-5?, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming fall 2010)
(manuscript at 7–14) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (presenting a model in which
managers commit fraud to maximize shareholder returns).
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Rule 10b-5 actions to insider trading defendants or do away with
vicarious liability for securities fraud. Although insider trading is
certainly wrong, it does not capture the distinct harm of fraudulent
misstatements that distort the market price of a security. The
significance of a misstatement does not hinge on whether some
individual benefited from it, but on whether reasonable investors
would believe the misstatement to be important. Although enforcing
norms against corruption helps enable an efficient market, markets
also need some assurance about the reliability of information in order
to function. Obtaining this assurance requires targeting not only the
individuals enriched but also the corporations whose regulatory
filings and financial statements are permeated with misstatements.
The increasing focus of securities law on the scienter inquiry,
which mainly assesses the enrichment of a defendant, rather than
materiality, which evaluates the potential harm to the market of the
misstatement, is perhaps the strongest evidence that Rule 10b-5 is
becoming an unjust enrichment rule. Reversing this trend may
require revival of the materiality standard. The materiality standard
may be a better way of managing the administrative costs of Rule
10b-5 while avoiding a conflict with the first-order concern of
235
encouraging efficient markets. In applying the materiality standard,
courts would be asking the question that matters—does the
misstatement affect the ability of the markets to value a stock?—
rather than the secondary question of whether the misstatement was
made to enrich an insider. If the materiality standard were defined
with sufficient specificity, it could screen cases without merit as ably
as the “concrete benefits” standard, keeping administrative costs low.
Courts and policymakers should thus reject efforts to define
materiality so broadly that securities fraud liability can be triggered
236
by all forms of unjust enrichment. As I argued in an earlier article,
the expansive version of materiality set forth in SAB No. 99 increases
237
the costs imposed by securities fraud class actions. Even minimal
inflations of earnings might be material under Rule 10b-5, so long as

235. See, e.g., James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP.
L. 513, 550 (2009) (proposing that courts should focus on the persistence of financial
misstatements in assessing their materiality).
236. It is worth noting that, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court observed: “We
find no authority in [Section 10(b)], the legislative history, or our previous decisions for varying
the standard of materiality depending on . . . whether insiders are alleged to have profited.” 485
U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988).
237. See Park, supra note 235, at 550–52.
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the plaintiff can plead that such inflation is associated with insider
stock sales or management bonuses. Courts are less able to dismiss
meritless securities fraud class actions at the motion to dismiss stage
on materiality grounds so long as such allegations are present.
Companies should not be liable for every form of unjust enrichment
by their agents, but rather should only be liable for the largest and
238
most persistent misstatements that distort their market value.
Narrowing the materiality standard would focus securities fraud class
actions on the first-order concern of efficient markets rather than the
second-order concern of unjust enrichment.
B. The Unjust Enrichment Principle
The best way to reconcile the unjust enrichment principle with
the conception of Rule 10b-5 as an antifraud rule is to think of unjust
enrichment as a distinct but second-order concern. As this Section
shows, rather than solely being concerned with economic efficiency,
Rule 10b-5 also reflects public values. Although subjecting market
participants to liability under a broadly worded principle may cause
concern, this Section argues that overenforcement of the unjust
enrichment principle is unlikely and offers suggestions for structuring
the doctrine that implements the unjust enrichment principle.
1. The Unjust Enrichment Principle as a Public Value. Although
the efficient-markets purpose of Rule 10b-5 is important, it is
undeniable that Rule 10b-5 is also concerned with unjust enrichment.
The rise of the unjust enrichment principle reflects the reality that
239
securities regulation is not solely concerned with efficiency but also
implements widely recognized public values. Though there are
dangers in relying on an unjust enrichment principle—most notably

238. See Park, supra note 235, at 518–19 (arguing that vicarious liability for securities fraud
should not be triggered by misstatements that are only qualitatively material).
239. Economists are generally not concerned with the distributional issues that are the focus
of the unjust enrichment principle. For example, a policy is Kaldor-Hicks efficient when the
gains from a policy are greater than the losses, so that the gaining parties could theoretically pay
off the losing parties, regardless of whether such a payoff actually occurs. See John R. Hicks,
Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 712 (1939) (“If measures making for
efficiency are to have a fair chance, it is extremely desirable that they should be freed from
distributive complications as much as possible.”); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of
Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939) (“In all
cases . . . where a certain policy leads to an increase in physical productivity, and thus of
aggregate real income, the economist’s case for the policy is quite unaffected by the question of
the comparability of individual satisfactions . . . .”).
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that the principle’s application may be driven by uninformed
240
populism —those dangers are likely manageable because of the high
transaction costs of the principle’s enforcement.
A number of legal scholars have argued that the law reflects
241
important public values that are widely recognized by a community.
The use of the unjust enrichment principle to shape the contours of
Rule 10b-5 might be characterized as an application of a public
242
value. The unjust enrichment principle is rooted in societal norms
reflected in many areas of the law. Ronald Dworkin notes the
existence of a common law principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted
to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or
to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by
243
his own crime.” Similarly, statutory and constitutional prohibitions
against government corruption reflect the idea that if government
officials profit personally from their offices, government will be less
244
likely to operate for the public interest.

240. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 210–12 (1990) (criticizing the SEC’s
use of the “Small Dollar program” to achieve “high visibility and [a] publicly-favorable
response”); cf. Crane, supra note 17, at 1162–63 (discussing the belief that “the general public
often overreacts to risks, thus prompting excessive levels of risk regulation” in the context of
antitrust).
241. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1007, 1015 (1989) (“The core idea of public values scholarship is that there are at least
some values . . . that have worth and contribute to the moral growth of our society.”); Owen M.
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11
(1979) (noting that constitutional provisions reflect public values that “give our society an
identity and inner coherence—its distinctive public morality”); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1692 (1984) (“[T]he Constitution
requires all government action to be justified by reference to some public value.”).
242. Elsewhere, I argue that principles-based enforcement actions by securities regulators
often reflect public values. See, e.g., Park, supra note 17, at 668 (“By articulating public values,
[principles-based enforcement actions] may decisively address public concerns.”).
243. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 23–24 (1967) (quoting
Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511 (1889) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
244. See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
341 (2009) (arguing that a primary concern of the U.S. Constitution is addressing corruption).
Corruption can distort the political process on which any democracy relies. It does so in at least
two ways. First, it results in a system in which the political process reflects the interests of a few
rather than the collective will of the public. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003)
(“Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger
that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but
according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the
officeholder.”). Second, it results in a system in which those who are elected to serve the public
instead enrich themselves. See, e.g., Teachout, supra, at 373–74 (“To the delegates, political
corruption referred to self-serving use of public power for private ends, including, without
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At its core, the unjust enrichment principle applied to the
securities regulation context sets limits on the extraction of wrongful
gains from securities markets. Even if those limits are not always
clear, it is undeniable that they exist. The principle is partly premised
on the idea that in American society, markets are meant to increase
245
social welfare. To the extent that markets primarily benefit only a
few privileged individuals, they are not fulfilling their social function.
Such a principle is not based solely on economic considerations but is
a public value grounded on moral considerations.
Although at first glance it seems that the unjust enrichment
principle has little applicability to securities markets, which are
premised on the idea that some market participants will enrich
themselves over others, there is a consensus that certain types of
enrichment go too far and are therefore unjust. Just as government
will not function if it is permeated by corruption, there is a sense that
246
markets permeated with unjust enrichment will ultimately fail.
Steve Thel has found that the legislative history of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reflects a concern with
preventing market manipulation rather than solely a desire to target
247
fraud. Donald Langevoort notes that insider trading enforcement is
motivated by expressive considerations and a fear that “market
norms too easily create subcultures that glorify and rationalize
248
selfishness.” The unjust enrichment principle is also reflected in the
limitation, bribery, public decisions to serve private wealth . . . and use by public officials of their
positions of power to become wealthy.”).
245. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in
the Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283–96 (2003) (describing the
positive social welfare implications of network effects on markets); John F. Berry III, The
Economics of Outsider Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1315–19 (1981)
(arguing that the purpose of securities markets is Pareto optimal resource allocation); Dalia
Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1861, 1906 (2003) (describing the acceptance of markets by progressives for instrumental
reasons).
246. See, e.g., David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White
Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1438 (2008) (“The public law doctrines punishing
supposed injuries to honest government have begun to blend with, or morph into, doctrines
punishing actions alleged to cause diffuse harms to the honesty of the capital markets.”).
247. See Thel, supra note 3, at 409 (“[S]urely, one trying to explain the enactment and
objectives of the Exchange Act cannot forget that in 1934 there was a widespread consensus
that excessive stock market speculation and the collapse of the stock market had brought down
the economy, and that those who enacted the Exchange Act were primarily concerned with
preventing a recurrence.”).
248. Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1328 (1999).
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249

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires top executives to
disgorge bonuses that they received based on financial results that
250
were later found to be false.
It is telling that both those who would expand the reach of Rule
10b-5 and those who would limit its reach agree on one thing: unjust
enrichment is a category of conduct that is particularly significant.
Even the Delaware Court of Chancery, not known for its inclination
to regulate with a heavy hand, applied the unjust enrichment
principle in a case against HealthSouth founder Richard Scrushy
when there was earnings manipulation but a civil fraud case could not
251
proceed because of a pending criminal case. The court required
Scrushy to pay millions of dollars in restitution to HealthSouth
252
without a finding of any culpable intent. Even if not all would agree
with respect to the unjust enrichment principle’s scope, there seems
to be a consensus that the principle matters.

249. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
250. See id. § 304, 116 Stat. at 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006)).
251. In a derivative case, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion for summary
judgment in favor of shareholder plaintiffs who pressed a state law unjust enrichment claim
against Scrushy, who had paid back a $25 million loan from HealthSouth with HealthSouth
stock that later collapsed in value. In re HealthSouth S’holders Litig., 845 A.2d 1096, 1099–1100
(Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 847 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2004). Because Scrushy was subject to a criminal
proceeding, the plaintiffs did not contend that he acted with intent or that he knew that
HealthSouth’s financial statements were inflated. Id. at 1103 n.10. Instead, they argued that,
regardless of whether Scrushy defrauded the company, he was unjustly enriched by the
transaction and the transaction should be rescinded. Id. at 1103.
Vice Chancellor Strine noted that in Delaware, unjust enrichment is defined broadly as
“the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience.” Id. at 1105
(citing Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 232–33 (Del. 1999)). Strine noted that Scrushy was in a
position of superior knowledge with respect to the contents of HealthSouth’s financial
statements. Id. at 1106. Even without fraudulent intent, Strine found a substantive unjust
enrichment claim, explaining: “Whether or not Scrushy breached any cognizable duty in signing
those statements, he was undoubtedly unjustly enriched when the company of which he was a
fiduciary bought back shares from him at a price inflated by false financial statements he had
signed.” Id.
The Delaware Chancery’s decision in Matter of HealthSouth Shareholders Litigation,
845 A.2d 1096 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 847 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2004), is consistent with a pattern
identified by Edward Rock in which Delaware courts apply broadly worded standards through
adjudication to create narratives that instruct directors and officers with respect to their duties.
See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997) (“[T]he Delaware courts fill out the concept of ‘good faith’ through
fact-intensive, normatively saturated descriptions of manager, director, and lawyer conduct, and
of process—descriptions that are not reducible to rules . . . .”).
252. In re HealthSouth, 845 A.2d at 1106.
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2. Translating the Unjust Enrichment Principle into Doctrine.
The unjust enrichment principle is more controversial than the
efficient-markets conception of Rule 10b-5. As a general matter,
public values, which reflect moral judgments, are more likely than
economic analyses to involve difficult choices between competing
253
considerations. For the unjust enrichment principle to continue to
be relevant, courts must feel comfortable translating it into doctrine.
Though vagueness may be an inevitable shortcoming of the unjust
enrichment principle, the doctrinal framework set forth by the
Supreme Court in O’Hagan is a useful starting point that with
modification may be workable.
Despite the wide recognition of the unjust enrichment principle,
there are a number of objections that could be raised to the use of
Rule 10b-5 to enforce the principle. First, the expansion of Rule 10b-5
reflects a general increase in federal involvement with corporate
254
governance that might stifle a “race to the top.” It might be more
appropriate for state corporate law to regulate unjust enrichment
255
than for federal securities law to do so. Second, an unjust
enrichment principle can evoke moralistic thoughts of class
256
resentment and redistribution. In times of economic crisis, the
public tends to focus on the great wealth captured by those who work

253. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,
417 (1999) (arguing that deterrence rhetoric and analysis of its costs and benefits “elides the
points of moral contention that motivate public positions on . . . disputed issues”).
254. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1595 (2005) (“[S]tates can be expected to be more
effective in setting the appropriate corporate governance default rules than Congress or the
SEC.”). But see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from
History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793 (2006) (arguing that federal intervention has protected
investors).
255. Although insider trading is now covered by federal law, it might have been
conceptualized as a breach of the state fiduciary duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein,
Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123, 123 (1998) (arguing that the harm
of insider trading could be addressed by state law); see also Bainbridge, supra note 134, at 1266–
68 (arguing that courts should incorporate state law in interpreting federal insider trading
prohibition).
256. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 248, at 1329 (noting, with respect to insider trading
prohibitions, that “there may be an emotional component in which envy and frustration at the
wealth and power of economic elites, and resulting mistrust, also play a role”); Jonathan
Weisman, Sudeep Reddy & Liam Plevin, Political Heat Sears AIG: Obama Vows to Block
Bonuses, But It May Be Too Late, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2009, at A1 (describing outrage at
bonuses paid to employees of AIG).
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257

in the securities industry. Calls for reform are often rooted in
258
nothing more than a sense that an injustice has occurred. Third, the
unjust enrichment principle is problematic because of its vagueness.
Due process requires reasonable notice as to the conduct that will
259
incur a government sanction. Unlike the antifraud rule, which
points to a particular type of misconduct—misleading representations
or omissions—the unjust enrichment principle does not single out any
particular misconduct as actionable. As a result, an unjust enrichment
principle gives regulators and courts a great deal of discretion to
260
define the contours of Rule 10b-5 in unpredictable ways.
At their core, these objections are based on a fear of
overenforcement. But overenforcement may be less of a problem for
unjust enrichment claims than it is for securities fraud class actions.
Because the unjust enrichment principle targets gains by individuals,
the potential recovery is often smaller than for a securities fraud that
harms thousands of shareholders, and thus is less likely to attract
entrepreneurial plaintiffs. Because they usually deal with individual
transactions, unjust enrichment claims are not as susceptible to
aggregation through class actions as fraud claims. And as seen in the
context of insider trading, unjust enrichment claims can be difficult to
establish. As a result, unjust enrichment claims are most likely to be
brought by government enforcers, who may have fewer incentives to
261
overenforce. Enforcers might use limited resources to target the
257. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 110–13 (1994) (describing populist influence on securities
regulation).
258. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of
Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 851 (1997) (“[M]any people argued . . . that securities trading
was harmful because it was a zero-sum game, in which repeat players could make consistent
gains at the expense of wave after wave of neophytes.”).
259. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (“It is established that a law
fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it
leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits . . . .”) (quoting Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1966)).
260. A number of commentators have noted the tendency of the SEC to engage in
“regulation by enforcement.” See, e.g., ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION
336 (1982) (“[T]he SEC has abused its prosecutorial independence by transforming its
enforcement program into a policy-making, and, therefore, highly political tool.”); Pitt &
Shapiro, supra note 240, at 155. But see Park, supra note 17, at 635–41 (critiquing the
“regulation by enforcement” argument).
261. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: A Proposal for
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (2008) (“A monopolistic public enforcer can deal with the
overdeterrent potential of an overbroad liability rule through use of discretionary
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most egregious, clear-cut cases of securities-related unjust
enrichment. This enforcement might both deter the undesirable
conduct and have an expressive value in applying public values to the
securities markets.
Moreover, many of the concerns about overenforcement might
be met through further definition of the doctrinal test that
implements the unjust enrichment principle. As noted earlier,
O’Hagan can be read as setting forth three elements for a Rule 10b-5
262
unjust enrichment claim. The unjust enrichment principle applies to
(1) deceptive conduct (2) coinciding with a securities transaction (3)
that enriches some individual at the expense of others.
The first element, deceptive conduct, increases the range of Rule
10b-5 because, unlike the antifraud rule, it does not require a specific
misrepresentation or omission directed at the market or investors.
Under the unjust enrichment principle, a broader range of conduct—
such as theft, manipulation, or an undisclosed special arrangement—
is sufficient to trigger Rule 10b-5. Though it attaches to a wider range
of conduct, the requirement of deception provides a significant limit
to the reach of the unjust enrichment principle. One way of further
limiting the unjust enrichment principle would be to require a
263
showing of intentional misconduct. The concern that the principle is
too vague might be partially met by reserving its application to the
worst forms of misconduct. Limiting the unjust enrichment principle
to intentional misconduct might help ensure that enforcement focuses
on cases in which there is more likely to be social consensus that the
conduct in question is wrong.
Perhaps a natural limit on the reach of the unjust enrichment
principle is that the opportunity for deceptive schemes varies
depending on the status of the individual as a fiduciary, an agent, or
264
an outsider. Obviously, the fiduciary has the greatest opportunities
to deceive. Fiduciaries are trusted to make a wide range of decisions
on behalf of those who may not be sophisticated or have the ability to
monitor the fiduciary. The fiduciary is given a great degree of trust
nonenforcement, or by pursuing a cooperative approach to regulation, and it can adjust its
approach if it appears to have gotten the deterrence calculus wrong.”).
262. See supra Part II.C.
263. In contrast, a traditional Rule 10b-5 securities fraud action can proceed with a showing
of recklessness. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
264. In the context of insider trading, “outsider” often refers to a person with an agency
relationship to the corporation. Here, “outsider” simply refers to an individual without a
relevant fiduciary or agency relationship.
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and thus significant opportunities to engage in deceptive conduct
without fear of discovery.
Like the fiduciary, the agent also is entrusted to act on behalf of
a principal, who may not be able to monitor the agent. The difference
between the agent and fiduciary is that the agent’s responsibilities are
usually narrower. The unjust enrichment principle may thus be
relevant to a narrower range of conduct with respect to the agent.
Finally, the outsider has no obligations or power and thus has
limited opportunity for deception. The outsider will have to take
extreme measures, such as theft, to obtain enrichment. Given the
costs of such measures, deceptive conduct by outsiders that could be
subject to the unjust enrichment principle will be less common than
such conduct by fiduciaries and agents.
The second element of the O’Hagan test, the requirement that
unjust enrichment coincide with a securities transaction, can also
serve as an important limit on the type of wrongful conduct that
might trigger Rule 10b-5. Not just any wrongful conduct triggers Rule
10b-5; rather, there must be a substantial connection to a securities
transaction. Thus, if someone embezzles money from a bank and
invests the money in a stock, that might satisfy the deceptive conduct
element of the unjust enrichment test, but there would be enough of a
disconnect between the initial theft and subsequent investment so
that the second element of coinciding with a securities transaction
265
would not be met.
The third element, the requirement of enrichment by an
individual, might naturally be limited by the requirement that unjust
enrichment liability can only be triggered if the enrichment occurs at
the expense of others. A likely criticism of the Rule 10b-5 unjust
enrichment principle is that it arguably jettisons traditional limits to
Rule 10b-5, such as fiduciary and agency relationships, and leaves
only an amorphous concept of wrongfulness. The third element could

265. In addition, to partly meet the concern of preempting state law, Rule 10b-5 unjust
enrichment claims might be limited to securities transactions on a national exchange. Other
securities transactions might be better regulated through state unjust enrichment law. State
unjust enrichment laws differ from the Rule 10b-5 unjust enrichment principle in that some
states do not require an element of deception. See In re HealthSouth S’holders Litig., 845 A.2d
1096, 1099 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 847 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2004) (“[N]either [unjust enrichment nor
equitable fraud] is dependent on Scrushy’s actual knowledge of the inaccuracy of HealthSouth’s
financial information.”). In contrast, some deceptive conduct (though not necessarily a specific
misrepresentation directed at the market) is required to support a Rule 10b-5 unjust enrichment
claim. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
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be modified in such a way as to meet this objection so that although a
fiduciary or agency relationship is not a prerequisite to triggering the
unjust enrichment principle, the difficulty of establishing this element
might differ based on whether the individual is a fiduciary, an agent,
or an outsider. Given their broadly defined duties to shareholders,
fiduciaries might face a rebuttable presumption that wrongful
enrichment occurred at the expense of others. With agents and
outsiders, there might be no presumption, and it would be the
plaintiff’s burden to prove that the wrongful enrichment occurred at
the expense of others.
3. Application of the Unjust Enrichment Principle.
The
application of this test can be illustrated by a simple example relating
to a possible extension of the unjust enrichment principle. In light of
the recent public backlash against excessive compensation
266
packages, one can imagine circumstances in which Rule 10b-5 could
be used to challenge stock-based compensation obtained through
misconduct. Such unjust enrichment relating to securities obtained as
executive compensation would be difficult to distinguish from insider
trading by agents prohibited in O’Hagan.
Envision a case in which the CEO of a publicly traded company
is negotiating with the board and deliberately submits false
information to the board’s compensation committee, knowing it will
be used in determining the CEO’s compensation, much of which is in
the form of stock and stock options.
Under a narrow antifraud reading of Rule 10b-5, such
misconduct might not be actionable. The misrepresentation is not

266. See, e.g., Ian Bremmer & Sean West, AIG and “Political Risk,” WALL ST. J., Mar. 20,
2009, at A15 (“The bonuses represent greed in the face of dire circumstances, which resonates
with Joe the TARP-funder.”); Weissman et al., supra note 256 (describing outrage at bonuses
paid to employees of AIG). On July 30, 2009, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo
released a report detailing bonuses paid to various employees of banks receiving government
bailout funds. See ANDREW M. CUOMO, NO RHYME OR REASON: THE “HEADS I WIN, TAILS
YOU LOSE” BANK BONUS CULTURE (2009). The report sparked a flurry of front-page articles
questioning how compensation could remain so high despite the losses suffered by the banks.
See, e.g., Susanne Craig & Deborah Solomon, Bank Bonus Tab: $33 Billion, WALL ST. J., July
31, 2009, at A1; Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During Bailouts,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A1. It is important to note that the criticism of executive
compensation practices is not limited to populists. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
1 (2004) (“[O]ne economist has calculated that the dramatic growth in executive pay during the
1990s was outpaced by the increase in the volume of research papers on the subject.”).
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directed at investors or the market, and it might not be material even
if it had been so directed.
There could, however, be a cause of action under the modified
O’Hagan test for unjust enrichment. First, there is deceptive
misconduct. This is a prime example of the broad range of contexts in
267
which fiduciaries have the opportunity for deceptive enrichment. If
a CEO influences the process by which his compensation is set, he has
a unique ability to manipulate the process. If his deception is
intentional, it is especially blameworthy. Second, the deceptive
misconduct is in connection with a security—stock-based
compensation. The deception allowed the CEO to obtain more stock
than he merited. Finally, because the CEO is a fiduciary, there would
be a rebuttable presumption that the inflated compensation came at
the expense of shareholders.
Such a use of Rule 10b-5 no doubt would be controversial, but
courts could conceivably uphold it as an extension of O’Hagan. If
such a case succeeds, it would only be the latest step in the gradual
expansion of Rule 10b-5 based on the unjust enrichment principle.
CONCLUSION
Rule 10b-5 is now much more than a provision that “catches
fraud.” Although it has primarily been an antifraud rule that
facilitates efficient markets, Rule 10b-5 is also shaped by an unjust
enrichment principle covering deceptive conduct related to a
securities transaction that enriches an individual. The increasing use
of the unjust enrichment principle has not only expanded the reach of
Rule 10b-5 but also has limited it in important ways. Rather than
being unrelated areas of law, insider trading and securities fraud
doctrine are both increasingly shaped by the unjust enrichment
principle.
Courts, regulators, and academics should all recognize the
important role played by the unjust enrichment principle in the
context of Rule 10b-5. At the same time, courts should be wary of
relying on the second-order concern of unjust enrichment to the
extent that it unduly diverts Rule 10b-5 from its first-order concern of
deterring material misrepresentations about a stock that prevent
267. The question might be more difficult if there were only a failure to disclose rather than
an affirmative deception. Cf. Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 165, at 1656–67 (examining the
question of whether fiduciaries have a duty to disclose in transactions with company
shareholders).
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markets from functioning efficiently. Rather than using the narrow
“concrete benefits” scienter test as a way of separating good claims
from bad, a stricter materiality standard is a more promising way of
ensuring that securities fraud class actions are limited to
misstatements that impact the market.
Perhaps the main lesson of the unjust enrichment principle is that
securities regulation is about more than efficient markets. There is a
strong case, reflected both in Rule 10b-5 doctrine and in academic
commentary, that public values play some role in regulating the
conduct of market participants. Although there are qualms about
allowing populism to influence the regulatory regime, the reality is
that values such as the unjust enrichment principle continue to play
an important role in securities regulation. Many see a test for unjust
enrichment as unworkable; however, overenforcement is unlikely,
and the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Hagan suggests a doctrinal
foundation that can be modified so that a workable Rule 10b-5 unjust
enrichment principle can continue to develop.

